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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

Protocols and Architecture for Privacy-preserving Authentication and Secure
Message Dissemination in Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks
The rapid development in the automotive industry and wireless communication technologies have enhanced the popularity of Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs). Today, the automobile industry is developing sophisticated sensors that can provide a
wide range of assistive features, including accident avoidance, automatic lane tracking,
semi-autonomous driving, suggested lane changes, and more. VANETs can provide
drivers a safer and more comfortable driving experience, as well as many other useful
services by leveraging such technological advancements. Even though this networking technology enables smart and autonomous driving, it also introduces a plethora
of attack vectors. However, the main issues to be sorted out and addressed for the
widespread deployment/adoption of VANETs are privacy, authenticating users, and
the distribution of secure messages. These issues have been addressed in this dissertation, and the contributions of this dissertation are summarized as follows:
Secure and privacy-preserving authentication and message dissemination in VANETs: Attackers can compromise the messages disseminated within
VANETs by tampering with the message content or sending malicious messages.
Therefore, it is crucial to ensure the legitimacy of the vehicles participating in the
VANETs as well as the integrity and authenticity of the messages transmitted in
VANETs. In VANET communication, the vehicle uses pseudonyms instead of its real
identity to protect its privacy. However, the real identity of a vehicle must be revealed when it is determined to be malicious. This dissertation presents a distributed
and scalable privacy-preserving authentication and message dissemination scheme in
VANET.
Low overhead privacy-preserving authentication scheme in VANETs:
The traditional pseudonym-based authentication scheme uses Certificate Revocation
Lists (CRLs) to store the certificates of revoked and malicious entities in VANETs.
However, the size of CRL increases significantly with the increased number of revoked
entities. Therefore, the overhead involved in maintaining the revoked certificates
is overwhelming in CRL-based solutions. This dissertation presents a lightweight

privacy-preserving authentication scheme that reduces the overhead associated with
maintaining CRLs in VANETs. Our scheme also provides an efficient look-up operation for CRLs.
Efficient management of pseudonyms for privacy-preserving authentication in VANETs: In VANETs, vehicles change pseudonyms frequently to avoid
the traceability of attackers. However, if only one vehicle out of 100 vehicles changes
its pseudonym, an intruder can easily breach the privacy of the vehicle by linking the
old and new pseudonym. This dissertation presents an efficient method for managing
pseudonyms of vehicles. In our scheme, vehicles within the same region simultaneously change their pseudonyms to reduce the chance of linking two pseudonyms to
the same vehicle.
KEYWORDS: Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks, Authentication, Security, Privacy preservation.
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Chapter 1 Introduction

People’s desire for using connected devices in day to day life has resulted in enormous
growth in Internet of Things (IoT). It is estimated that the number of IoT devices
will exceed 60 billion by 2025. Internet of Vehicles (IoVs) is likely to make key contribution to such rapid growth. With the support of roadside infrastructure, IoVs
help drivers, pedestrians and other vehicles in using the data created by vehicular Ad
Hoc Networks (VANETs). Moreover, VANETs have brought a wide range of applications in Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) through vehicle to vehicle (V2V),
vehicle to infrastructure (V2I), and vehicle to everything (V2X) networks. Although
including these network systems provide ”smart” driving features and autonomy, they
also introduce a plethora of attack vectors to otherwise secure vehicles. It happens
because of the opening up of many communication ports to communicate with the
outside world, such as sensing tire pressure, sensing front collision, receiving emergency safety messages or traffic-related messages, etc. Different vulnerabilities arise
due to intruders capability in identifying and targeting high-value vehicles through
openly shared credentials such as public cryptographic keys or RF identifiers such as
the frequencies of individual vehicles or tire pressure monitoring sensors (TPMS).
To prevent such vulnerabilities, efficient authentication schemes for entities participating in the VANET need to be designed and implemented. Without an efficient
authentication framework, attackers could easily connect to VANETs to endanger
other drivers. For example, malicious vehicles may broadcast false data about an
accident to avert other drivers from using any specific road, thereby creating traffic
jams around. It may also pretend to be a Roadside Unit (RSU) or electronic toll
booth to steal other driver’s sensitive information. While the existing standard IEEE
1609.2 uses Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) for signature verification, a significant limitation still lies in the verification of a single ECDSA signature
requiring 7 ms of computation time for on-board unit (OBU) hardware [87]. This imbalance between the time needed to process and the time needed to receive gives rise
to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. Therefore, designing an efficient authentication
scheme is of great importance in the VANET environment.
The traditional approach to secure VANETs is to deploy Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), which usually use certificate revocation lists (CRLs) to manage revoked
certificates. In the PKI based schemes, the Trusted Authority (TA) assigns certificates of public keys for every registered entity in the network. A CRL is a list of all
revoked certificates, usually signed and issued by the TA. In a PKI based scheme,
when a vehicle receives a message from an unknown entity, it first checks its revocation status against CRL to verify the sender’s certificate for message authentication.
However, the size of CRLs increases with the number of revoked vehicles which will
increase the overhead in the authentication process. Moreover, significant communication overhead is expected to occur to broadcast CRLs to all entities. At the same
time, enough storage space is needed for vehicles to store CRLs. Besides, each vehicle
broadcasts a safety-related message every 100-300 ms, according to DSRC [49]. In
1

Figure 1.1: VANET Scenarios

such a scenario, each vehicle may receive a large number of messages every 100-300
ms, and it has to check the revocation status against CRL to authenticate the received
messages. Therefore, it is necessary to design and implement efficient protocols to
ensure privacy, authenticity, and secure message dissemination in VANETs. Next,
we discuss the necessary background, motivation, and findings of our dissertation.
1.1

Background

This section introduces the VANET system and presents some of the security and
privacy issues in VANET. We also describe different state-of-the-art solutions on the
security, privacy, and authentication in VANET.
1.1.1

VANET

A vehicular Ad Hoc Network (VANET) is basically a type of Mobile Ad Hoc Network
(MANET) which consists of vehicles as nodes. General model of VANETs proposed
in the literature consists of two major components: On Board Unit (OBUs) installed
on vehicles and Road Side Units (RSUs) installed on road side to support the infrastructure needed for the deployment of VANETs. Typically OBU utilizes a service
that is provided by an application hosted at RSUs. Each vehicle is assumed to be
equipped with a set of sensors to collect phenomena surrounding the vehicle and
the OBU processes the information collected by the sensors and sends/receives them
to/from other relevant vehicles directly or through nearby RSUs [3]. The RSUs may
also connect to the Internet to provide the necessary services to vehicles.
A broad range of applications can be enabled by mainly two types of communications: (i) infrastructure-based communications (Vehicle to Infrastructure (V2I)
communication) and (ii) direct communications between vehicles (Vehicle to Vehicle

2

(V2V) communication) [128] (see Fig 1.1). Major efforts for standardizing VANETs
have been carried out by the IEEE 802.11 Task Group by defining enhancements to
IEEE 802.11 required to support Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) applications. This amendment is currently known as IEEE 802.11p. The wireless communication capability between moving vehicles is achieved using dedicated short range
communication (DSRC). It is anticipated that DSRC will be used for both vehicle-tovehicle communications and vehicle-to-infrastructure communications. The spectrum
is seen as particularly useful for V2X communications because it can support very
low-latency, secure transmissions, fast network acquisition and in general, the ability
to handle rapid and frequent hand-overs that are inherent in a vehicular network, as
well as being highly robust in adverse weather conditions [105].
1.1.2

Security in VANETs

Security is crucial in VANETs because vehicles in the network can easily be attacked
by malicious vehicles due to the dynamic nature of network formation. Some of these
attacks may be carried out by nodes inside the network (i.e., nodes that have been
already authorized to be a member of a VANET); other attacks may be carried out
by vehicles that do not belong to the VANET. Among the existing types of attacks
in VANETs, the most common security attacks are :
• Sybil attack: Sometimes a false message by a single malicious vehicle is not convincing. A Sybil attack occurs when a malicious vehicle uses multiple identities
in parallel to impersonate a number of vehicles and generate multiple messages.
Vehicles use transmitted messages to make decisions, so it is necessary to resist
a Sybil attack.
• Message modification attack: An attacker alters the existing messages in this
type of attack. They can modify the content of the transmitted messages or
broadcast messages for their own benefit.
• Message linking attack: In message linking attacks, an attacker links two different messages sent by the same sender vehicle and tracks the path traversed by
the vehicle. They can breach the privacy (e.g., travel history, places of travel)
of the vehicle users.
• Denial of Service (DoS) attack: The attacker injects dummy messages into the
networks to jam the communication channel. It can affect the VANET’s performance as well as traffic safety. An attacker could generate a large number of
traffic messages and cause an approaching vehicle not to get the actual warning
messages. Therefore, the discrepancy of processing times and receiving times
leads to a Denial of Service (DoS) attack.
• Replay attack: In case of a replay attack, attacker eavesdrops a transmitted
message and re-transmits it several times to create confusion.
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Figure 1.2: Securing VANETs using a central Trusted Authority (TA).

1.1.3

Privacy in VANETs

Privacy refers to the privacy of the vehicles (drivers) and the location of the vehicles. When a vehicle sends a message, no one (except relevant authorities) should
be able to determine the identity or location of the vehicle from the messages a
vehicle sent. Ensuring privacy of vehicles (drivers) is one of the many challenging
issues for which an efficient solution needs to be found because an adversary could
otherwise trace a vehicle’s traveling routes by capturing and analyzing it’s messages
[71] and identify the vehicle (driver) which may have drastic consequences for the
drivers. To address this issue, many researchers have proposed protocols wherein
vehicles use pseudonyms instead of their real ids in communication while at the same
time enabling authorities to extract the real ids from pseudonyms to trace and punish misbehaving vehicles. Such protocols are called conditional privacy-preserving
protocols. Assigning pseudonyms to vehicles and changing them frequently is one
of the strategies used to ensure the privacy of vehicles. Although the frequency of
such change remains debatable, vehicles must change pseudonyms more frequently
to maximize privacy. Factors such as availability and storage size play an important
role in determining the rate at which pseudonyms should be changed.
1.1.4

Authentication in VANETs

Although the potential benefit of VANETs is increasing, malicious attackers can intercept, modify, and replay transmitted messages due to the wireless nature of V2V
and V2I communication. Therefore, a vehicle user needs to check the authenticity and
integrity of a received message as well as the legitimacy of the sender vehicle to accept
the message. Authentication needs to be achieved at two levels – first at the node
level, referred to as node authentication, and second at the message level, referred to
as message authentication. All messages sent by a vehicle should be authenticated before being processed. The basic principle of message authentication can be simplified
4

as signing a message by the sender and then verifying the authenticity and integrity
of the message at the receiver’s end. Certain authentication requirements such as
low computational overhead, robust and scalable authentication, efficient certificate
revocation must be addressed and solved to ensure secure communication in VANET.
A vast majority of the papers in the literature addressing security, authentication, and privacy use a TA for obtaining and loading OBUs and RSUs with security
parameters such as keys, certificates, and pseudonyms (illustrated in Fig 1.2).
1.1.5

Privacy-preserving, Authentication, and Secure Message Dissemination in VANETs

In this section, we group the protocols [71] addressing privacy, authentication, and secure message dissemination in VANETs into different classes and discuss the benefits
and drawbacks of the protocols in each class.
Protocols that use ID-based signatures and group signatures for authentication of messages:
Generally, the TA is responsible for issuing security parameters, such as keys, certificates, and pseudonyms to vehicles. When the TA detects (or is informed by an RSU) a
malicious vehicle, it revokes the vehicle’s certificates (generally, one certificate for each
pseudonym) and informs all other vehicles about it. This is a centralized approach
which does not scale well. Moreover, as the CRL grows, the message authentication
overhead increases. In this subsection, we discuss some solutions proposed for solving
these problems using ID-based signatures and ID-based cryptography [8, 90, 17].
Zhang et al. [136] introduced an on-the-fly group creation approach in which the
RSUs create and maintain groups. This allows vehicles to join the group maintained
by the nearby RSU and also anonymously broadcast authenticated messages to vehicles within its group. However, authenticated message dissemination among vehicles
in different groups is not addressed. Their approach is conditional privacy-preserving.
In the decentralized group authentication protocol presented by Zhang et al. [135],
RSUs are responsible for maintaining and managing the group of vehicles within its
transmission range for supporting secure communication between them. The basic
idea behind their scheme is as follows: the TA uses bilinear pairing for generating
keys and issuing certificates to vehicles and RSUs. The TA also maintains the CRL.
A Tracing Manager (TM) is responsible for tracing malicious vehicles. When a vehicle passes a nearby RSU, it uses signcryption [139] to send an encrypted request to
the RSU for a group key. After receiving the group key, it uses the group signature
scheme [38] to sign and send messages to members in its group. However, authenticated message dissemination between vehicles in different groups is not addressed.
Xiong et al. [123] propose a scheme for managing communication among a group of
vehicles effectively and spontaneously. Their scheme is based on revocable ring signatures proposed by Liu et al. [65]. This scheme allows only valid ring members to
generate a ring signature for a message. In addition, trusted authorities are responsible for tracing and revoking the real signer. However, message verification overhead
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increases when the number of vehicles in the group grows. Biswas et al. [14] present
a scheme for authenticating safety messages broadcasted by RSUs. Their scheme is
also based on ID-based signatures [8, 90] and uses proxy signatures based on Elliptic
Curve Digital Signature Algorithm(ECDSA), the digital signature algorithm specified
in IEEE 1609.2 standard [1] for message authentication. They compare the overhead
incurred by their algorithm in signing and verification with that of a few other existing algorithms. Among the five algorithms compared, their algorithm is the only one
which uses both ID-based and proxy-based signature schemes and yields comparable
performance.
Chim et al. [27] propose a software based Secure and Privacy Enhancing Communication Scheme (SPECS) which relies on ID-Based Cryptography (IBC) with
bilinear pairing. In this scheme, after an initial handshaking with the nearby RSU,
vehicles belonging to the same group can communicate securely without the aid of the
RSU. They make use of two Bloom filters [15], namely, positive and negative filters
to reduce the message overhead and false positives during message authentication.
Positive filter stores the authentic vehicle’s hash value of pseudonym and messages,
and the negative filter stores the hash value of pseudonym and messages of vehicles
that have not been authenticated. It has low communication overhead and it also
has an effective batch verification success rate. However, it can be vulnerable to
impersonation attack.
Hsiao et al. [48] present two broadcast authentication schemes (FastAuth and
SelAuth) to deal with the signature flooding problem (i.e., reduce the computation
overhead involved in verifying a large number of signatures in a short amount of
time). The FastAuth protocol is based on chained Huffman hash trees (a data structure designed by them) for securing periodic single-hop beacon messages. This scheme
supports a one-time signature scheme whose signature verification is claimed to be 50
times faster and signature generation is claimed to be 20 times faster than using Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), the Digital Signature Algorithm
specified in IEEE 1609.2 standard [1] for authentication. The other protocol, namely,
the SelAuth protocol, helps in isolating malicious nodes faster by selecting messages
that need to be verified before forwarding. They use a selection algorithm to distinguish benign neighbors from malicious neighbors which helps in restricting the spread
of messages with invalid signatures to a small area. They also show that SelAuth incurs 10% - 35% additional computational overhead compared to other closely related
schemes while containing 99% of invalid signatures to one hop. They only focus on
broadcast authentication and not point-to-point message authentication.
Wasef and Shen [117, 118] try to reduce the time involved in checking the CRLs
during message authentication; they use the keyed Hash Message Authentication
Code (HMAC), wherein the key used to calculate the HMAC is shared only between
non-revoked OBUs. However, vehicles must still verify the validity of certificate and
signature because it still uses a TA for generating and distributing secret keys and
certificates to all OBUs. Certificate revocation is triggered by the TA which involves
revoking the current secret key and securely distributing a new secret key to all
non-revoked OBUs.
The dual authentication and key management technique presented by Vijayaku6

mar et al. [107] is based on Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) where both hash code
and fingerprints of each participating vehicle are used for dual authentication. In their
approach, the TA divides the users into two groups, namely Primary and Secondary,
and then generates two different group keys for these two different groups of users. It
provides service to vehicles’ users on the basis of a Service Level Agreement (SLA).
The shared group keys are refreshed when a new user joins the group or an existing
group member leaves the group, thus making this scheme resistant to forward secrecy
and backward secrecy attack. It is shown that this scheme is computationally more
efficient compared to some of the other existing schemes, such as Chinese Remainder
Group Key (CRGK) [138] and Key-tree Chinese Remainder Theorem (KCRT) [140].
However, they do not address the privacy of users in their work.
Zhang et al. [133] present a conditional privacy-preserving authentication protocol based on ID-based aggregate signatures and bilinear pairing based cryptography.
Their approach allows hierarchical aggregation of signatures and batch verification.
Their hierarchical aggregation technique allows re-aggregation which reduces transmission and storage overhead. Moreover, it has lower waiting time for aggregation
compared to some of the other approaches presented in the literature.
Lai et al. [58] discuss the security challenges, requirements and benefits of group
communication in Software Defined Network (SDN) based 5G-VANETs. They propose a Secure Group Mobility management Framework (SGMF) for group-oriented
vehicular communication based on modified IPsec packet and an addressing method
described in [56]. Their scheme performs better compared to some of the existing mobility management schemes with respect to hand over signaling overhead and latency.
However, the hand over signaling cost may increase as the density and mobility of
vehicles increase.
Cui et al. [29] propose a Secure Privacy-preserving Authentication scheme using
Cuckoo Filter (SPACF). Their goal is to achieve higher success rate than some of the
previously proposed schemes in the batch verification phase. Cuckoo filter and binary
search are used to accomplish their goal. SPACF is shown to be more efficient than
some of the previous schemes because it is pairing free and does not use map-to-point
hash functions. However, this ID-based scheme still suffers from inherent key escrow
problem despite eliminating much of the limitations of Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI) and ID-based Batch Verification (IBV).
Table 1.1 and 1.2 summarize the strengths and weaknesses of the protocols discussed in this section.
Protocols that use RSUs for Authentication and/or Key Distribution
Some protocols presented in the literature, offload some work (such as message authentication, packet forwarding) from vehicles to RSUs and/or some work (such as
key management and CRL distribution, detecting and reporting suspicious vehicles)
from TA to RSUs. In this subsection we discuss protocols belonging to this category.
The RSU-aided message authentication scheme, called RAISE, proposed by Zhang
et al. [129] offloads the overhead involved in message authentication to RSUs. This
requires dense deployment of RSUs. Vehicles establish a shared key with the RSU
7

Table 1.1: Brief summary of the protocols that use ID-based signatures and/or group
signatures for authentication of messages
Paper

Focus
area(s)
Authentication,
privacy, traceability,
and
confidentiality

Method(s)
used
Bilinear
pairing,
group
signature [38],
and signcryption [139]

Zhang
al. [135]

et

Xiong
al. [123]

et

Secure
V2V
communication

Bilinear pairing
and Revocable
ring
signatures [65]

Biswas
al. [14]

et

Authentication

ID and Proxybased signature
scheme

Chim
al. [27]

et

Authentication, Identity Based
security, and Cryptography
privacy
(IBC)
with
bilinear pairing
Hsiao
et Broadcast au- Chained Huffal. [48]
thentication
man
hash
trees (based on
Merkle
hash
tree and Huffman tree)
Vijayakumar Secure
data Vehicular
et al. [107]
transmission
Public
Key
in VANETs
Infrastructure
(VPKI)
and
dual authentication and key
management
techniques
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Strengths and Weaknesses
RSUs are responsible for maintaining groups, so decentralized in some sense; no scalable mechanism to support
broadcast throughout the network; group-signatures generally have high signature verification and revocation costs.
Does not require ubiquitous
deployment of RSUs; message verification cost may increase as the number of vehicles grows.
Lower overhead compared to
some compared algorithms;
addresses only authentication
of RSU messages.
Low overhead and authenticates messages effectively; can
be vulnerable to impersonation
attack.
More efficient than ECDSA
specified in IEEE 1609.2 standard; the protocol for authenticating beacons will not work
correctly if beacons are missed.
Provides resistance against forward secrecy and backward
secrecy attacks; takes single
broadcast message to get the
updated group key; does not
address location privacy.

Table 1.2: Brief summary of the protocols that use ID-based signatures and/or group
signatures for authentication of messages continued ...
Zhang
et
al. [134]

Privacy, security, and authentication

Wasef
Fast message
and
authenticaShen [117, tion
118]
Lai et Secure group
al. [58]
communication
in
SDN
based
5G-VANETs
Cui et
al. [29]

Privacy, security, and Authentication

Bilinear pairing
based cryptography; multiple
trusted authorities;
ID-based
aggregate signature
technique
for authentication
Bilinear pairing

PKI;
secure
group management and group
handover

Cuckoo filter and
binary
search
methods

Certificate distribution is not centralized; Bilinear pairing based
cryptography generally has high
computational overhead.

Claims to make the CRL checking
process faster; High overheads involved in distributing a secret key
to all non-revoked OBUs.
Provides better group hand over
authentication in terms of hand
over signaling overhead and latency; cost may increase with increase in density and mobility of vehicles.
It is pairing free and does not use
map-to-point hash functions; suffers from inherent key escrow problem.

using Diffie-Hellman algorithm. They also take the k-anonymity [102] approach to
prevent an adversary from associating a message with a particular vehicle to ensure
the privacy of the vehicles.
The message authentication scheme proposed by Zhang et al. [130] is an extension of the scheme presented in [129]; this extension includes a method for vehicles
to cooperatively authenticate messages in the absence of an RSU. Hao et al. [46, 45]
present a distributed key management framework and also a method for cooperative
message authentication for speeding up message authentication. Sun et al. [97] also
present a group signature and identity-based signature scheme for secure and authenticated message dissemination. Papadimitratos et al. [81] also present a distributed
method for distributing CRLs using RSUs to reduce the overhead involved in CRL
distribution.
Lu et al. [68] propose a Social-based PRivacy-preserving packet forwardING protocol which prevents packet analysis attack, packet tracing attack, black hole attack
and grey hole attack in vehicular Delay Tolerant Networks (DTNs). This protocol
relies on placing RSUs at high social intersections and using group signatures to prevent the disclosure of identity of senders, target vehicles and relaying vehicles. The
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RSUs help in forwarding packets between vehicles which helps in reducing packet
loss.
Shim’s [94] Conditional Privacy-preserving Authentication Scheme (CPAS), is a
secure conditional privacy-preserving scheme for V2I communications. It uses bilinear pairing based cryptography to generate and store key parameters and ID-based
signatures for authentication. Their scheme requires RSUs to verify messages sent
by vehicles in batches to speed up the message authentication process. They do not
address V2V communications.
The Logical Key Hierarchy (LKH) based schemes [47, 93, 22] and Topology Matching Key Management (TMKM) based schemes [99, 100, 101] for Group Key Management (GKM) wherein all the key management functionalities are handled by the
Key Distribution Center (KDC) have re-keying overhead. Park et al. [82] address
this problem and propose a Group Key Management (GKM) scheme, called RSUbased Decentralized Key Management (RDKM). RDKM is based on versakey framework [23] for secure vehicular multicast communication. In this scheme, part of the
GKM functions are offloaded to RSUs in a distributed manner. For efficient operation
of this protocol, the authors suggest placing RSUs at the intersection of streets. For
forming groups, the authors suggest placing vehicles within the region of an RSU in
the same group. This helps an RSU manage the group keys efficiently. Their performance evaluation shows that this approach results in approximately 60% to 80%
reduction in communication overhead compared to some of the existing GKM-based
schemes. They also propose a new performance measure namely, Group Key Management Overhead (GKMO), and observe a rapid increase in GKMO for both LKH
and TMKM schemes compared to the RDKM scheme. However, RDKM requires
more storage space to store information about keys at each vehicle compared to the
LKH and TMKM schemes.
In a Sybil attack, a malicious node can use multiple identities and inject false
messages into the network. Zhou et al. [141] propose a protocol, called Privacy
Preserving Detection of Abuses of Pseudonyms (P 2 DAP), to detect Sybil attacks.
In their scheme, the Department of Motor Vehicles is used as the TA to provide a
pool of pseudonyms to each vehicle and releases part of its workload to RSUs as
follows. Two-level hashing of every pseudonym is generated where the key of the
first-level hash is known to the RSUs to identify whether the pseudonyms belong to
the same group of vehicles. The second-level hash key is known only to the TA to
map each pseudonym to an individual vehicle. Each time an RSU finds suspicious
pseudonyms, it reports this incident to the TA for verification. But the generation
and management of a large number of pseudonyms can be costly.
The authentication and key establishment scheme for V2V and V2I communications, presented by Li et al. [59], is also based on ID-based public-key cryptography,
blind signatures [70, 30], and one-way hash chain. The blind signature scheme used
in their scheme allows vehicles to communicate with the RSUs to access the services
provided by them without revealing their real identities, location, and so on. They
use TA for populating the OBUs with the necessary secret key, group key and pseudo
id offline or through a secure secret channel. The methods used are not simple and
moreover using a centralized TA is not scalable.
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Table 1.3: Summary of the protocols that use RSUs for authentication and/or key
distribution
Paper
Li
et
al. [59]

Focus
area(s)
Location privacy and authentication

Zhang et
al. [129,
130]

Privacy, security, and authentication

Lin
et
al. [64]

Privacy, security and authentication

Lu
et
al. [68]

Secure packet
forwarding
in vehicular
DTNs
and
privacy

Park et
al. [82]

Distributed
key management
Privacy and
security;
Sybil Attack
Detection

Zhou et
al. [141]

Method(s)
used
ID-based publickey
cryptography,
blind
signature,
and
one-way
hash
chain
RSU-aided message authentication, cooperative
message
authentication,
Diffie-Hellman
algorithm
and
k-anonymity
Uses
TA
to
get
(public,
private)
keys;
TESLA
[84]
hash chains for
message authentication
RSU
assisted
packet forwarding;
Bilinear
pairing

PKI and RSUbased key management
Distributed
passive overhearing by RSUs;
PKI
based
pseudonym assignment
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Strengths and Weaknesses
Solves
location
privacy,
anonymity problem;
uses a
central trusted third party, which
is not scalable.

Offloads the overhead involved in
message authentication to RSUs;
low communication overhead.
Diffie-Hellman protocol is prone
to man-in-the middle attack; vehicles still need to be pre-loaded
with public keys.
Aims to reduce the overhead involved in certificate generation
and distribution.

Provides high packet delivery ratio, preserves conditional privacy
and resists packet tracing attack,
packet analysis attack, and black
(grey) hole attacks; ignores mobility of vehicles and fluctuations in
traffic.
Reduces re-keying overhead; can
have high storage overhead to
store a large number of keys.
Detects Sybil attacks with low
overhead and delay.

The secure privacy-preserving protocol presented by Lin et al. [64] aims to reduce
the overhead related to signing and verifying packets based on public key cryptography. They propose attaching a short message authentication code tag with each
packet instead of a signature. As in the TESLA protocol [84], each vehicle generates
a hash chain h1 , h2 , ..., hn from a random seed S; here, hn = S, and hi = H j−i (hj ) for
i < j, where H is a hash function. Each element in the hash chain is used as key to
generate MAC codes for several packets and the keys are released after a short delay
δ (as in [84]) for the receiver to authenticate the packet.
Table 1.3 summarizes the strengths and weaknesses of the protocols discussed in
this section.
Protocols based on Smart Cards and Tamper-proof Devices
Conventional PKI [88] based schemes require each vehicle to verify the signatures
of each of the other vehicles sending messages to it; this results in computational
overhead for the OBUs of the vehicles. To overcome this drawback of PKI based
approach, Zhang et al. [131] proposed an ID-based Batch Verification (IBV) scheme.
Under IBV scheme, an RSU can verify the signatures of multiple messages all at
once; so signature verification is more efficient under this approach. The authors use
ID-based cryptography for generating private keys associated with pseudo-identities.
However, the IBV [131] scheme depends on the availability of a tamper-proof hardware device on each vehicle to securely store the system-wide secret key. Since the
system wide secret key is stored on tamper-proof hardware of each vehicle, if one of
these devices is compromised, the whole system is compromised. Moreover, this does
not ensure privacy of vehicles because real ID of a vehicle could be traced by other
vehicles.
The authentication protocol presented by Ying and Nayak [126, 125] uses dynamic
login IDs to preserve privacy. The user gets a smart card loaded with the vehicle’s
pseudonym and password. Smart card inserted into the vehicle’s OBU, authenticates
its owner by asking for the real ID and password and generates dynamic login identity for the user and sends it to the nearby RSU. Upon receiving this message, the
RSU verifies if it is valid, computes its own dynamic login id and sends its dynamic
login id and the dynamic login id of the vehicle to the TA. The TA computes the
anonymous keys and the corresponding certificates for the vehicle and sends them to
the RSU securely. The RSU then broadcasts the keys and certificates securely to the
vehicles in the region and the corresponding vehicles receive them and use them for
communication. Their privacy-preserving anonymous authentication scheme not only
authenticates received messages but also verifies the legitimacy of the senders of the
messages (i.e., it checks if the sender is a malicious node which forged the ID of some
legitimate node). In addition, to reduce the computational complexity, they do not
use bilinear pairing based cryptography. It allows the user’s password to be changed
dynamically. So, this scheme can resist smart card loss attack, impersonation attack,
and password guessing attack.
The protocol presented by Paruchuri and Durresi [83] also uses smart cards to
generate anonymous keys on-the-fly for establishing secure V2V as well as V2I com12

Table 1.4: Summary of protocols that make use of smart-cards and tamper-proof
devices
Paper

Focus
area(s)
Shim’s [94] Privacy and
authenticated
V2I communication

Method(s) used
ID-based cryptography; bilinear pairing
based cryptography
for key generation

Paruchuri
and Durresi [83]

Authentication, Smart cards to store
privacy, and keys and perform
security
encryption/decryption
Ying and Privacy, secu- Login ids are genNayak [126] rity, and au- erated dynamically
thentication
for ensuring privacy

Ying and Privacy, secuNayak [125] rity and authentication

Zhang et
al. [131]

Diffie-Helman protocol; smart cards;
hash functions; centralized trusted authority for loading
smart-cards with login id and password
Authentication, ID-based cryptogbatch verifica- raphy; Camenischtion
Lysyanskaya (CL)
signature; tamperproof device
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Strengths and weaknesses
Fast batch verification of
messages at the RSUs; vehicles need to be equipped
with Tamper-Proof Devices
(TPDs); TPDs could be susceptible to side-channel attacks.
Requires the use of smart
cards.

Smart cards are used for
generating login ids dynamically; it can resist password
attacks, and impersonation
attacks; can tolerate smart
card loss; can handle compromised RSUs.
Can resist smart card loss
attack; can also resist impersonation and password
guessing attack.

The real ID of the vehicles
could be tracked; vulnerable
to impersonation attack.

munication. The TA issues smart cards as well as the keys to the vehicles and certificates to RSUs. The vehicle’s ID, required cryptographic keys, and driver information
are stored on the smart card. To send a message to vehicles within its group, first a
vehicle needs to get a session key securely from the nearby RSU. To send a message
m to a vehicle within its group, it encrypts the message m and the ID of the OBU
and the signature of m (hash of m encrypted with its private key VP r ) encrypted with
the public key ERSUPu of the RSU using the session key Ke as follows and sends it:
EKe (m, ERSUPu (OBUID , EVP r (H(m))))
A receiving vehicle can decrypt the message using the session key issued by the RSU.
However, it cannot decrypt the second part because the private Key of the RSU
is needed for decrypting the second part. The second part is used by the RSU to
trace misbehaving nodes, when necessary. Table 1.4 summarizes the strengths and
weaknesses of protocols discussed in this section.
Next, we discuss some of the protocols that minimize the overhead involved
in using the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for generating and assigning keys,
pseudonyms, certificates, and CRLs to vehicles and/or RSUs.
Minimizing the Overhead involved in Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
based Protocols
The anonymous authentication protocol presented by Wang et al. [110] uses the TA
to assign each vehicle and each RSU a long term certificate during registration. Each
RSU is responsible for assigning a master key to each vehicle entering its region after
authenticating the vehicle based on its long term certificate. Then the vehicle uses the
master key to generate pseudonyms locally and uses them to sign messages to preserve
anonymity. This approach has lower signature verification overhead compared to the
protocols presented in [118] and [53]. Moreover, it supports both single and batch
authentication of messages.
The Secure and Authenticated Key Management Protocol (SA-KMP) presented
by Hengchuan et al. [103], combines the idea of the Public Key Regime (PKR) (which
delegates the distribution of public keys to the RSUs, eliminating the need to distribute digital certificates) proposed by Shen et al. [92] and the idea of 3-D matrix
key distribution scheme (which generates the keys dynamically instead of preloading
the keys), proposed by Hamid et al. [42, 43]. Wasef et al. [116] propose a mechanism
based on PKI which supports not only location privacy but also authentication; it
also uses a distributed approach for certificate revocation. They use the Message
Authentication Acceleration (MAAC) [117] protocol to make the revocation checking
process faster without checking the CRLs. However, their solution can only preserve
the location privacy of vehicles within its group. They also propose a method for
mitigating Denial of Service (DoS) attacks.
Biswas and Misic [12],[11],[13] use proxy signatures for privacy-preserving authentication. One drawback of this solution is that it requires larger keys for generating
and verifying signatures. As a result, it incurs higher computational cost compared
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Table 1.5: Summary of the protocols that address the overhead involved in PKI based
protocols
Paper

Focus area(s)

Method(s)
used
PKI and Message Authentication Acceleration (MAAC)
protocol
PKI, proxy signatures

Strengths and weaknesses

Wasef et
al. [116]

Location privacy,
authentication,
and
certificate
revocation

Biswas
and
Misic [12,
11, 13]
Dong et
al. [34]

Haas et
al. [41]

Self
authentication
and
anonymous message delivery
Privacypreserving data
forwarding;
specifically
designed
for
service oriented
VANETs
Distribution of
CRLs

Lite-TA-based
public
key
cryptography;
on-path onion
encryption
scheme

Efficient, robust, and ensures
higher trust level; high computational overhead.

PKI and Bloom
filters [15]

Does not require ubiquitous deployment of RSUs; false positives
can be prevented; computational
overhead is somewhat low.
Ensures unlinkability, traceability, and defense against replay attack; V2V authentication is not
addressed.
The authors try to achieve a
tradeoff between privacy, security,
and efficiency; decentralized certificate distribution; frequent certificate changes could cause high
overhead.
Can predict uplink and downlink connectivity probabilities in
VANETs; assumes RSUs are
trustworthy.

Shen et
al. [91]

Secure communication

Chameleon
hash
signature [54]

Whyte et
al. [119]

Security credential management
system;
V2V
communication

Public Key Infrastructure

Alshaer [5] Securing VANET
connectivity with
the support of
RSUs

Vehicular
Public
Key
Infrastructure
(VPKI)
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Fast revocation check process
and mitigates DoS attacks; location privacy may not be ensured
against outsider attacks.
Preserves message integrity and
anonymity; RSU assisted proxy
signatures.

Table 1.6: Summary of the protocols that address the overhead involved in PKI based
protocols continued ...
Hengchuan Authenticated
et
key manageal. [103]
ment

Wang et
al. [110]

Privacy, security, and authentication

Public
key
regime
(PKR)
[92];
the 3-D matrix
key distribution
scheme [42, 43]
Does not use
PKI for generating pseudonyms
and the related
certificates
to
vehicles;
vehicles generate their own
pseudonyms

This approach is more scalable
than PKI based approaches; key
generation takes less time compared to Elliptic Curve DiffieHellman and Diffie-Hellman protocols.
This approach has less signature
verification overhead compared to
the protocols presented in [118]
and [53]; it supports both single
and batch authentication.

to other competitive schemes such as Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems (ECC) to provide
similar security strength.
Dong et al. [34] propose a privacy-preserving data forwarding scheme for service
oriented VANETs based on Lite-TA-based public key cryptography and on-path onion
encryption scheme. This scheme has lower encryption cost and public key management complexity compared to conventional public key encryption schemes. However,
since this approach requires relaying nodes to encrypt the message before forwarding to prevent adversaries from tracing message flows, it incurs higher computation
overhead for forwarding packets.
Haas et al. [41] propose a method for quick, organized and efficient distribution
of CRLs through V2V communication [55]. This scheme ensures backward privacy of
revoked vehicles prior to their revocation. They use the probabilistic data structure
Bloom filters [15] for quickly checking CRLs. However, false positives may occur.
But they claim that, false positives can be avoided by discarding the certificate of
the vehicles that may trigger a false positive. The use of Bloom filters reduces the
overhead incurred for checking CRLs. It is observed that the distribution of CRLs
through V2V communication is more efficient and cost effective than the RSU-based
distribution scheme because it does not require widespread deployment of RSUs.
Many of the research works based on chameleon hash signature [54] using fixed
public keys for authentication do not guarantee message unlinkability. Shen et al. [91]
address this problem and propose a light weight privacy-preserving protocol that relies
on Elliptic Curve based chameleon hash signature and dynamic public keys. They
consider the registration phase and the mutual authentication phase between OBUs
and RSUs in their protocol. They also considered the TA tracking phase to ensure
authenticity and traceability. Whenever any suspicious event occurs, the TA can
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recover the real identity of the OBU that created the event by executing the TA
tracking phase. The use of chameleon hash-based signature for messages helps in
preventing replay attacks and impersonation attacks. However, V2V authentication
is not addressed in this protocol.
The Security Credential Management System (SCMS) proposed by Whyte et
al. [119] is based on PKI; it was developed under a cooperative agreement with
the United States Department of Transportation (USDOT), the leading candidate
for V2V security backend design in the United States. This scheme adds some additional features such as the number of vehicles it supports and tries to achieve a
tradeoff between security, privacy and efficiency of traditional PKI based approaches.
Additionally, they propose (i) a frequent certificate changing (e.g., every 5 minutes)
scheme to enhance protection against attackers outside of the SCMS and (ii) organizational separation of operations of SCMS to protect against attackers inside the
SCMS.
Alshaer [5] proposed a secure connection model based on the Vehicular Public
Key Infrastructure (VPKI) that utilizes trusted RSUs to establish secure connections
and distribute secret keys to vehicles within their transmission range. The probability of the number of reachable neighboring vehicles that a Communication Enabled
Vehicle (CEV) can reach has been derived using Exponential distribution of time and
space headways with a Robustness Factor (EwRF). They claim that suitable statistical distribution (e.g., exponential distribution, Generalized Extreme Value (GEV)
distribution) that characterizes inter-vehicle spacing can accurately contribute to secure connectivity. This approach requires the widespread deployment of RSUs and
RSUs are assumed to be reliable. Table 1.5 and Table 1.6 summarize the strengths
and weaknesses of the protocols discussed in this section.
Message Aggregation and Cooperative Message Authentication
Multiple vehicles could observe the same phenomena on the road and try to disseminate it to other vehicles which wastes bandwidth. To address this problem, message
aggregation (as has been proposed for sensor networks earlier) has been proposed.
Moreover, to reduce the overhead involved in message authentication, cooperative
message authentication wherein vehicles share the overhead due to message authentication, has been proposed. We discuss the protocols in these categories in this
subsection.
Protocols using Message Aggregation
The Aggregated Emergency Message Authentication (AEMA) scheme proposed by
Zhu et al. [40] is based on bilinear pairing. Under AEMA, each vehicle registers with
the TA (they call it an Offline Security Manager (OSM)) and obtains its public key
certificate. Then, when a vehicle needs to send an emergency message, it uses the
following format (T ype, Loc, ID, T ime, Sig, Cert) to send it. Here, T ype indicates the
type of the event, Loc is the location where the event occurred, ID is the pseudo ID of
the vehicle, T ime is the time when the event occurred, Sig denotes the signature of the
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message, and Cert is the certificate. The receiver verifies the validity of the certificate
Cert and the signature Sig and accepts the message. The authors assume that
each event is uniquely determined by T ype, Loc, and T ime. Hence, an intermediate
node receiving the message can eliminate duplicates and aggregate the messages.
The overhead involved in computing the signature based on bilinear pairing is of
some concern. In addition, the algorithm depends on the central OSM for issuing
certificates. The authors assume that each observed event has a unique type. This
scheme does not ensure location privacy of vehicles because each message carries the
location information of vehicles.
Dietzel et al. [32] proposed selective attestation and trust fusion to detect attacks
as well as mitigate their effects for semantic aggregation in VANETs. Their approach
is based on a generic data aggregation model, which makes it extensible and suitable
for the existing data aggregation schemes. In the trust fusion mechanism, multiple warnings of the same event are linked to alleviate the need for a Global Unique
Identifier system (GUID) by using a fuzzy logic technique. However, the bandwidth
needed for selective attestation could slow down the message dissemination process.
Many of the existing message aggregation techniques require roads to be segmented
into small fixed-size regions for aggregating messages originating from these regions.
However, messages originating across regions cannot be aggregated using these approaches. Van der Heijden et al. [106] address this problem and present a scheme
that allows more dynamic aggregation of messages.
Next, we discuss protocols in which vehicles cooperate to authenticate messages
in order to reduce the overhead involved in message authentication.
Protocols that use Cooperative Message Authentication or Batch Verification
Hao et al.’s [44] distributed key management and Co-operative Message Authentication Protocol (CMAP) based on short group signature [16] can detect compromised
RSUs and the malicious vehicles colluding with them. Vehicles getting keys from the
same RSU form a group. To ensure reliable key distribution, messages are encrypted
using Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES) and are transmitted using the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP). This scheme allows the cooperative
verifiers to cooperatively authenticate messages. Cooperative verifiers are selected
dynamically and distributively based on their own geographic locations relative to
the sender of the message. However, a malicious vehicle can pretend to be a cooperative verifier by creating many Sybil nodes within its transmission range, which makes
this scheme vulnerable to Sybil attack.
Most of the research work on secure incentive schemes focus only on cooperative
packet forwarding; but due to the high mobility of vehicles, packets could be lost. To
address this problem, Lai et al. [57] propose a Secure Incentive scheme for Reliable Cooperative downloading in highway VANETs (SIRC) that uses two phases, namely, cooperative downloading and cooperative forwarding which encourage vehicles to cooperate through an incentive scheme; SIRC utilizes aggregated Camenisch-Lysyanskaya
(CL) signature [21] to cooperate with others in securely downloading-and-forwarding
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packets. In this scheme, a reputation system is implemented to reward the cooperating vehicles and punish the malicious vehicles. In addition, a partial prepayment
strategy is used to minimize the payment risk to client vehicles. This scheme can resist
various attacks such as free riding attack, DoS attacks and packet injection/removing
attack. The performance evaluation of SIRC shows that it has high download success
rate, low download delay, and moderate computation and communication overhead.
A disadvantage of this approach is that the reputation information about vehicles
which have high variability in their spatial distribution need to be calculated and
stored.
Table 1.7: Brief summary of protocols that support message aggregation, cooperative
message authentication, and/or batch verification
Paper

Focus
area(s)
Emergency
message
authentication
Privacy, security, and authentication

Method(s)
used
Bilinear pairing;
message aggregation
Pseudonyms and
ID-based signature, hash message authentication code

Lin and
Li [63]

Privacy, security, and authentication

Lai
et
al. [57]

Reliable cooperative downloading

Cooperative
message authentication;
uses
large
number
of pseudonyms
for
ensuring
anonymity
PKI; incentive
scheme based on
reputation

Wang and
Liu [108]

Secure cooperative communication in
heterogeneous
vehicular networks

Zhu
et
al. [40]
Jiang et
al. [51]

PKI, stochastic
geometry theory
and
optimization

Strengths and weaknesses
Does not ensure location privacy; useful for propagation of
short emergency messages only.
Supports batch authentication
of requests; Tamper-proof devices (TPDs) are needed to
store pseudonyms; TPDs could
be susceptible to side-channel
attacks.
Due to the large number of
pseudonyms issued to vehicles,
CRLs could grow.

Can resist different types of
attacks including DoS attacks;
can be difficult to calculate
and store reputation information correctly.
Flexible; allows to switch between DSRC, D2D-V, and cellular networks modes; Requires
OBUs with high computation
power.

Wang and Liu [108] proposed a scheme that satisfies the security requirements in
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Table 1.8: Brief summary of protocols that support message aggregation, cooperative
message authentication, and/or batch verification continued ...
Dietzel et
al. [32]

Hao
et
al. [44]

Secure data aggregation

Generic
aggregation
model and
Fuzzy logic
methodology
Authentication, Bilinear
security,
and pairing;
privacy
short
group
signatures [16]

Extensible and alleviates the need
of a Global Unique Identifier system
(GUID); bandwidth overhead could
decrease dissemination speed.

Cooperative message authentication
to speed up authentication; does
not ensure location privacy of vehicles; vehicles in different regions
cannot securely exchange messages;
group-signatures generally have high
signature verification and revocation
costs; RSUs are assumed to be trustworthy; cooperative authentication
would work only if the density of vehicles is high; susceptible to location
modification because messages are selected for verification based on location information.

Vehicular Heterogeneous Networks (VHNs) wherein support for cooperative communication among various types of networks such as networks based on DSRC-based on
IEEE 802.11p, Device to Device (D2D) communication and cellular communication
needs to be provided. A mode selection algorithm that allows the OBUs to check
the remaining lifetime of a packet and switch between three different modes (DSRC,
D2D-V and cellular networks) is also presented. They found that sufficient power
and vehicle density are the main factors for the successful transmission of messages
securely in such networks.
Lin and Li [63] presented a cooperative message authentication scheme to reduce
not only the overhead involved in message authentication but also the authentication
delay. This scheme tries to minimize the authentication overhead on the same message
by different vehicles when vehicles are allowed to cooperatively authenticate messages.
To encourage vehicles to cooperate in message authentication, vehicles are issued
evidence tokens. An evidence token issued to a vehicle reflects its contribution to
authentication in the past; this encourages vehicles to participate in the message
authentication process, which helps in distributing the authentication load among
many vehicles. Evidence tokens are obtained from the TA via the RSU in its current
region. It also uses a large number of pseudonyms, which could result in long CRLs.
Jiang et al. [51] also propose an authentication scheme under which requests from
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multiple vehicles can be authenticated in batches rather than one by one. Cheon and
Yi [26] proposed a method for batch verification of multiple signatures generated by
different signers as well as a single signer. They showed how this technique can be
applied to the modified DSA and ECDSA based signatures. They also show that their
batch verification approach is seven times faster than individual verification. Wasef
et al. [115, 114] proposed a flexible certificate distribution scheme and an efficient
way for vehicles to update their certificates. To decrease the message authentication
overhead, they also proposed a method for verifying certificate-based signatures of
messages in batches. Zhang and Zhang [137] developed a method for aggregating
signatures in a certificate-less public key setting.
Table 1.7 and Table 1.8 summarize the strengths and weaknesses of the protocols
discussed in this section.
1.2

Motivation for the Dissertation

Although the potential benefit of VANETs is increasing, widespread deployment of
VANETs face some serious challenges. Due to the wireless nature of VANET communication, it is vulnerable to a large number of attack vectors. Malicious attackers can
intercept, modify, and replay transmitted messages due to the wireless nature of V2V
and V2I communication. Therefore, a vehicle user needs to check the authenticity
and integrity of a received message as well as the legitimacy of the sender vehicle
to accept the message. Authentication plays an important role in secure message
dissemination. Without an effective authentication framework, attackers could compromise other drivers on VANETs easily. For example, malicious vehicles spreading
false information about an accident might block the road, leading to a traffic jam.
It may also spoof an RSU or electronic toll booth to steal other drivers’ sensitive
data. Moreover, vehicle users may refuse to participate in VANET due to a lack of
privacy and security. We address this problem and present a distributed, scalable,
low overhead, and privacy-preserving authentication scheme in this dissertation. Our
scheme exploits Merkle Hash Tree and Modified Merkle Patricia Trie (MMPT) to
overcome the performance limitations of the conventional approach of authentication
such as ECDSA algorithm for efficient authentication of RSUs [74] and Vehicles [75]
in VANETs.
Most of the solutions for ensuring security and privacy in VANETs use a pseudonymbased approach to protect vehicles’ privacy. In a pseudonym-based approach, legitimate vehicles get a set of pseudonyms from a Certificate Authority (CA) or Trusted
Authority (TA) before participating in VANETs. Vehicles use pseudonyms instead
of real identities in V2V and V2I communication. In order to avoid traceability, vehicles change their pseudonyms frequently. When vehicles are about to run out of
pseudonyms, they request a new set of pseudonyms. Pseudonyms ensure conditional
privacy in the sense that TA can still retrieve the real ID of vehicles. So, the TA
can revoke the credentials and pseudonyms of malicious vehicles. In this approach,
Certificate Revocation List (CRL) is used to store all the unexpired pseudonyms of
revoked or malicious vehicles. The CA or TA also stores the credentials of revoked
or compromised RSUs in a CRL. TA distributes the CRLs periodically. Both vehi21

cles and RSUs store and check the CRL to authenticate each other. However, the
size of CRL increases with the number of revoked vehicles and RSUs which leads to
significant storage and computation overhead. It also incurs a higher delay to update and broadcast the CRL periodically. We present a low overhead and efficient
privacy-preserving pseudonym-based authentication scheme [77] to address the above
challenges. Our scheme leverages cuckoo filters to reduce the storage, computation,
and communication overhead associated with the CRL. Vehicles and RSUs only need
to store and check cuckoo filters for mutual authentication.
In a pseudonym based approach, vehicles are required to change their pseudonym
frequently to avoid traceability. However, periodically changing the pseudonym of a
vehicle is not effective to prevent pseudonym linking attacks. For example, suppose
out of 100 vehicles, only one vehicle changes pseudonym. In that case, an intruder
can easily link the old and the new pseudonyms used by the vehicle by linking two
messages to the same vehicle and track the path traversed by the vehicle. In addition
to that, more research needs to be done in devising an efficient method for managing
pseudonyms of vehicles.
Sometimes a single malicious message is not powerful enough to affect the security
of the VANETs system. However, a serious threat arises when a malicious vehicle uses
multiple pseudonyms in parallel to impersonate a number of vehicles and generate
multiple false messages. Since vehicles use the information in received messages to
make decisions or take action specially in a critical situation, such as a road accident
or traffic jam etc., vehicles unable to detect this type of attack become vulnerable.
Therefore, the number of pseudonyms and their validity period that a vehicle can use
should be limited.
We address the above issues and propose a distributed and decentralized certificateless authentication scheme [76] to efficiently store vehicles’ pseudonyms and their
corresponding ’current status’ values. Only one pseudonym of a vehicle is valid in
our scheme due to the concatenation of pseudonym expiration time to resist Sybil attacks. In our scheme, RSUs assist vehicles within their transmission range to change
their pseudonym by associating an expiration time with the registered pseudonym.
Once this expiration time elapses, the vehicle will again communicate with an RSU to
activate a new pseudonym from a pool of pseudonyms received from its home regional
TA during initial registration. We assume that a vehicle will always have a sufficient
number of pseudonyms, so that it will not need to reuse a pseudonym within a year.
Expiration time associated with a pseudonym helps vehicles within the same RSU’s
region to change their pseudonym simultaneously and frequently to reduce the chance
of linkability between the same vehicle’s two pseudonyms.
1.3

Organization of the Dissertation

The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows.
• In Chapter 2, we present a distributed, scalable, low-overhead and privacypreserving authentication scheme for VANETs. Our scheme utilizes a Merkle
Hash Tree (MHT) to authenticate Road Side Units (RSUs) and Modified Merkle
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Patricia Trie (MMPT) to authenticate vehicles. Upon successful mutual authentication of RSUs and vehicles, messages are encrypted and sent to RSUs
for further dissemination. Each RSU creates a group key for the legitimate
vehicles within its region to disseminate messages securely.
• We present a lightweight privacy-preserving V2I authentication scheme based
on cuckoo filters in Chapter 3. In comparison with Certificate Revocation Lists
(CRLs), the use of cuckoo filters significantly reduces the storage, communication, and computation overheads for V2I authentication.
• In Chapter 4, we present a Certificateless and REused-pseudonym based Authentication Scheme for Enabling security and privacy (CREASE) in VANETs.
Our scheme uses Merkle Hash Tree combined with Modified Merkle Patricia
Trie to efficiently store and manage the set of pseudonyms assigned to a vehicle. A vehicle in our scheme picks and uses a random pseudonym from a given
set of pseudonyms assigned to it as well as changes its pseudonym frequently
and securely to ensure privacy. In our scheme, each RSU assists vehicles in
its region to change their pseudonym simultaneously to prevent vehicles’ routes
being tracked; this is accomplished by assigning the same expiration time for
all the pseudonyms of all vehicles in its region.
• Finally, Chapter 5 summarizes the dissertation.
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Chapter 2 Secure and Privacy-preserving Authentication and Message
Dissemination in VANETs

In this chapter, we propose a distributed, scalable, low-overhead, and privacy-preserving
authentication scheme for VANETs. The proposed scheme uses a Merkle Hash Tree
(MHT) for authenticating Road Side Units (RSUs) and Modified Merkle Patricia Trie
(MMPT) for authenticating vehicles. We also present an informal analysis as well as
formal correctness proof of the proposed scheme.
2.1

Related works

In this section, we discuss some of the related works and their strengths and weaknesses. Many of the existing schemes presented in the literature [71, 118, 51, 142] use
CRL for authentication. However, the size of CRL grows with the increased number
of revoked entities (Vehicles and RSUs), which can cause significant computation and
storage overhead in large scale VANETs.
To address the computational and storage overhead caused by CRLs, Zhu et
al. [142] proposed a privacy-preserving authentication scheme based on group signature [25]. They divided the region into domains and an RSU authenticates a vehicle
whenever it receives a join request in its domain. After authentication, the vehicle
gets the group key for hash message authentication code (HMAC) computation to
facilitate message authentication without checking the CRL. HMAC is used to ensure
message integrity and reduce the number of invalid messages. RSUs are assumed to
be trusted in this scheme. However, any malicious entity can pretend to be an RSU
and steal the sensitive information of vehicle users.
Liu et al. [67] proposed a lightweight V2I authentication protocol that employs
group communication to reduce the computational overhead involved in checking the
CRL. In this scheme, first the TA predicts the RSUs that the OBU will pass by. After
that TA initializes a communication group containing the OBU and the RSUs and
distributes the group key to them. TA deletes the information about a misbehaving
vehicle and forwards this update to all RSUs. This approach is not scalable.
Wasef et al. [118] proposed an Expedite Message Authentication Protocol (EMAP)
based on the keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) to reduce the computation time for authentication and revocation process. In this scheme, only legitimate vehicles get a shared secret key from the TA to calculate HMAC. Later on,
vehicles broadcast messages along with the calculated HMAC to facilitate the revocation status checking process. This scheme reduces the revocation checking time
caused by conventional authentication schemes that adopt CRL. TA updates the
shared secret key whenever it revokes the certificate of misbehaving vehicles. However, it is difficult to update the shared secret key globally. Besides, TA broadcasts
a revocation message containing certificates of revoked vehicles. Thus, this scheme
still requires the distribution of CRL, which incurs communication overhead in the
system.
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Jiang et al. [52] proposed an anonymous batch authentication scheme (ABAH)
based on hash message authentication code (HMAC) to replace the CRL checking
process. In their scheme, a large area is divided into several domains, and RSUs
are responsible for managing vehicles in a localized manner. The RSU authenticates
vehicles by checking their revocation status in CRL and sends the group key to valid
vehicles. If the authentication fails, the RSU does not send the group key to the
revoked vehicle. After successful authentication, vehicles broadcast safety-related
messages containing HMAC, which is derived from the group key. However, the
revocation status checking process using CRL of vehicles still exists in their scheme.
Wang and Yuo [111] proposed a local identity based anonymous message authentication protocol (LIAP) in which vehicles and RSUs obtain long term certificate from
CA (Certificate Authority) for mutual authentication. In this scheme, the certificate
revocation list of RSUs (RCRL) and vehicles (VCRL) are distributed separately by
the CA. Each RSU uses a linear search algorithm to check VCRL for authenticating
vehicles. On the other hand, vehicles only store RCRL to check the validity of RSU.
After mutual authentication, vehicles get keys from RSUs to generate pseudonym for
V2V communication.
Paruchuri and Durresi [83] proposed a certificate-based scheme that provides
anonymous authentication using a smart card. The smart card stores vehicle’s information and required cryptographic keys. Only OBUs that have been authenticated
get session keys from RSU for secure and authenticated communication with other
vehicles as well as RSUs. However, each OBU stores many session keys from different
RSUs in this scheme. In addition to that, if the smart card is stolen or lost, then
secret information can be leaked.
Tangade et al. [104] proposed a decentralized and scalable privacy-preserving authentication scheme based on identity-based cryptography and symmetric hash message authentication code (HMAC). This scheme uses ID-based cryptography for authentication of vehicles by RSUs and HMAC for the vehicle to vehicle authentication.
However, they did not consider the authentication of RSU by vehicles during V2I
communication.
Motivated by the existing authentication schemes’ above drawbacks, we propose
a distributed and scalable conditional privacy-preserving authentication scheme for
VANETs. Our scheme uses a distributed architecture. Moreover, in our scheme, we
combine Merkle Hash Tree (MHT) root value with the latest MHT root-generation
timestamp to replace CRL of RSUs for efficient RSUs authentication. We use Modified Merkle Patricia Trie (MMPT) to efficiently manage revoked vehicles to overcome
the drawbacks of using CRL for authenticating vehicles. After successful mutual
authentication of RSUs and vehicles, messages are encrypted and sent to RSUs for
further dissemination. RSUs establish a group key shared only between legitimate
vehicles within its region to disseminate messages securely.
2.2

Background, System Model, and Design Goals

In this section, we first describe Merkle Hash Tree (MHT) [72] and Modified Merkle
Patricia Trie (MMPT), which are used in our scheme. After that, we briefly intro25

duce the system model. Then, we present our design goals and assumptions. We
do not provide a detailed description of RSA encryption, RSA decryption, RSA signature, RSA signature verification, secure hashing algorithm (SHA), and public key
certificate. We assume that the reader is familiar with these terminologies/concepts.

Figure 2.1: Merkle Hash Tree

2.2.1

Merkle Hash Tree

A Merkle Hash Tree (MHT) [72] is a hash-based [89] tree structure in which each leaf
node stores the data and each non-leaf node contains the hash of its children. Fig. 2.1
shows an MHT with four leaf nodes where data are stored and values stored at non-leaf
nodes are derived from hash of its children. MHT helps in verifying the integrity of
data stored at leaf nodes efficiently. For instance, we only need corresponding Missing
Hash Values (MHVs) of MHT (H2 , H3,4 ) and root value H1,4 instead of entire tree
structure to verify the integrity of Data1 . We can recompute the root hash value from
′
MHVs by first computing H1,2 = H(H(Data1 ), H2 ) and then H1,4 = H(H1,2 , H3,4 ).
′
If the computed H1,4 is same as the original root value H1,4 , integrity of Data1 is
ensured.
2.2.2

Modified Merkle Patricia Trie

Modified Merkle Patricia Trie (MMPT) is based on Patricia Trie and Merkle Tree
with additional optimizations to meet the requirements of Ethereum [121]. Patricia
Trie (also known as prefix tree, radix tree or trie) finds common prefix data more
efficiently compared to an hash table. It stores single character of the key or string
at each level. However, it has a time complexity of O(n) (where n is the length of
the key or string) for searching and inserting.
For example, there is a long string of nodes on the left side of Fig. 2.2 wherein most
of the nodes are non-leaf nodes and used to build a path to store the word ”TOAST”.
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Figure 2.2: Prefix Tree

It is necessary to read each letter in the word and travel down the corresponding path
to find the word. On the other hand, if there is currently no path with the same prefix
as the node key during the insertion of a node, the MMPT stores the remaining keys
in the key field of the leaf or extension node.
MMPT is a new data structure that binds a key with a value and can be authenticated cryptographically [69]. Every node in MMPT is expressed as a key-value pair.
This key-value pair is used as paths in MMPT, and nibble is the unit that composes
the path. Complexity involved for insert, lookup, and deletion of a node in MMPT
is O(logn) (where n is the total number of leaf nodes in MMPT). MMPT has three
types of nodes, i.e., leaf node, branch node, and extension node. Next, we describe
these nodes and also explain how we use MMPT to store the public keys of revoked
vehicles.
• Leaf Node: The prefix field in a leaf node determines the type of node, and
the prefix value of the leaf node in our model is 2. In our scheme, the leaf node
contains the public key P UV of a revoked vehicle V as key while value contains
the ID IDRSU of RSU that has reported about the vehicle.
• Branch Node: Branch nodes are non-leaf nodes and have more than one child
node. There are up to 16 branches, from 0 to f in a branch node where each
branch contains one hexadecimal digit. A branch node has a prefix value of 1
in our scheme.
• Extension Node: An extension node is an optimized node of a branch node.
The prefix value of an extension node in our scheme is 0. An extension node’s
key consists of a partial path (shared nibble) that allows us to skip ahead and
a pointer to the next node.
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Table 2.1: Information of Malicious Vehicles stored in MMPT
P UV
a711355
a77d337
a7f 9365
a77d397

RSU ID
43245699
43245676
43245625
43247681

Operations on MMPT
Next we explain how we use MMPT to store the pair (P UV , IDRSU ), where P UV is
the public key (in hexadecimal representation) of vehicle V which has been reported to
be malicious and IDRSU is the identity of the RSU which reported V to be malicious.
MMPT is used by an RSU for authenticating a vehicle V. Table 2.1 contains a sample
list of (P UV , RSU ID) pairs of vehicles reported to be malicious. In this table, public
keys of vehicles are given in hexadecimal form. Fig. 2.3 shows the MMPT storing
the four key-value pairs in Table 2.1, where all keys share the same nibble of a7. In
the MMPT, the root node is an extension node that contains the shared nibble (a7).
The ”next node” field in the root node points to the next node, which in our case is
a branch node (Branch Node 0). If we look at the first key (a711355) , we can find
1 after a7. This 1 allows us to skip ahead and leads us to the leaf node (Leaf Node
Insert (a77d397)

Search (a711355)

Root: Extension Node 0

Prefix
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0

a7
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Figure 2.3: Modified Merkle Patricia Trie storing the contents of Table 2.1
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0) in Fig. 2.3, where the remaining value of the key along with the RSU ID is stored.
Therefore, We need to start traversing from the root node to lookup a key in MMPT.
The insertion operation inserts the public key P UV of a malicious vehicle along
with the ID IDRSU of the RSU which reported the vehicle to be malicious into the
MMPT. To insert a entry, we need to traverse from the root node. As we traverse,
we need get the prefix of the current node and its nibbles. If the current node’s prefix
is 1, we check whether the slot corresponding to the next nibble of the branch node
points to NULL. If so, a new leaf node or a new extension node is generated based
on the remaining nibbles left in the key to be inserted. If not, then traverse down
to the next node. If the prefix of the current node is 0, then find the shared nibbles
and remaining nibbles left in the key. Next, generate a new leaf node, or a new
branch node, or a new extension node according to the remaining nibbles in the key
after sharing. For example, in Fig. 2.3, when we insert the key ”a77d397”, we first
start from the root node and look at the prefix of the current node. In our case, the
root node is Extension Node 0, and the pointer to the next node field points to the
Branch Node 0. The slot corresponding to the next nibble in the Branch Node 0 is
not NULL, and the remaining nibbles in the key are greater than 1. Next, we travel
down to Extension Node 1, where the partial path has diverged at Branch Node 1.
Hence the slot corresponding to the Branch Node 1 is NULL, and the left nibble in
the key is 1. Therefore, a new leaf node (Leaf Node 3) is generated into this branch.
The branch nodes, extension nodes, and leaf nodes used in MMPT help in shortening the length of the unique path to the leaf nodes and make all the three basic
operations (lookup, insert, and delete) efficient. So, to insert/delete/search the public
key of a revoked vehicle that is 2028 bits long, we need to traverse at most 512 nodes
in the MMPT, if we use hexadecimal representation of the key; if we use Base64
representation, we traverse at most 338 nodes in the MMPT.
2.2.3

System Model

The proposed VANET system architecture, shown in Fig. 2.4, has two layers. The
upper layer consists of the Trusted Authority (TA) and Regional Trusted Authorities
(RTAs), and the lower layer consists of RSUs and OBUs. TA is the root of the whole
system, while each RTA acts as a lower-level local TA. In this scheme, TA may represent a whole country, or a state and RTA may represent a state or a county/district.
When a vehicle moves from the region covered by one RTA to a region covered by
another RTA, the RTA under which that vehicle has been registered (called home
RTA) will be contacted to get the credential of the vehicle for authentication. TA
and RTAs communicate with each other through a secured channel. On the other
hand, RSUs and vehicles communicate with each other based on the Dedicated Short
Range Communications (DSRC) protocol standard [49]. We also assume communication between the RSUs as well as between RSUs and RTAs are secure. Functions
of TA, RTAs, RSUs, and vehicles are described next:
• TA: The TA generates its public and private keys (P UT A , P RT A ) and distributes P UT A to all RTAs, RSUs, and vehicles securely. The TA also generates
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Figure 2.4: Proposed VANET architecture for efficient authentication of RSUs and
vehicles
public, private key pair (P URT A , P RRT A ) for each RTA and distributes them
to the respective RTAs securely.
• RTA: Each RTA is responsible for generating and distributing public and private keys for all vehicles as well as RSUs registered under it. Each RTA also
generates the pseudo-ID of vehicles and maintains an MHT that is created
based on the public key of all RSUs registered under it. RTA also forwards
the credentials of RSUs and vehicles registered under it to the TA. RTA also
distributes P UT A to all RSUs in its region and all vehicles registered with it.
• RSU: RSUs are placed along the roadside and get their public and private key
pair (P URSU , P RRSU ) from their local RTA, called home RTA.
• Vehicle (OBU): For a vehicle to participate in VANET, it must be registered
with its RTA, called home RTA. Each vehicle V is equipped with an On
Board Unit (OBU) for communication with other vehicles and nearby RSUs.
The OBU also stores the vehicle’s public and private key pair (P UV , P RV ),
pseudo-ID (P IDV ), certificate (CertV , signed by the RTA), and MHT root
generation timestamp (TmhtRoot ) generated and signed by the RTA as well as
P UT A . CertV contains P UV , P IDV , and certificate expiration time Texp . CertV
and MMPT are used by RSUs to authenticate the vehicle V.
2.2.4

Design Goals

Following are the design goals behind our protocol:
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• Resilience to message tampering: We aim to provide an efficient scheme
for mutual authentication of vehicles and RSUs, to ensure that message comes
from a legitimate source without its payload being manipulated.
• Privacy preservation: Privacy is a major concern in VANETs. So, the true
identity of a vehicle should never be revealed in communication, even if all the
RSUs are compromised. In our proposed scheme, only the RTA under which the
vehicle is registered and the TA know the real identity of vehicles and can reveal
the real identity of a vehicle to authorities in case the vehicle is determined to
be malicious.
• Non-repudiation: Non-repudiation refers to the ability to ensure that a
party sending a message cannot deny sending of the message. To ensure nonrepudiation, we use the signature algorithms to sign messages during the communication process.
• Authentication of RSUs and Vehicles: Our scheme is designed to reduce
the overhead related to using CRL for authenticating entities (Vehicles and
RSUs) in VANETs. In our scheme, we use MHT to authenticate RSUs and
MMPT to authenticate vehicles. We do not use CRLs for authentication.

2.2.5

Assumptions

We assume the following:
• The TA has more computing, communication, and storage capacity than RTAs;
RTAs have more computing, communication, and storage capacity than RSUs;
RSUs have more computing, communication, and storage capacity than OBUs.
• Each RTA constructs an MHT of the public keys of RSUs registered with that
RTA.
• The TA, RTAs, and RSUs use MMPT to store the public keys of revoked
vehicles.
• RSUs are responsible for receiving messages from vehicles in its region and
authenticating messages; if necessary, each RSU is also responsible for disseminating the messages to all vehicles in its region as well as its home RTA for
further dissemination.
2.3

Proposed Scheme

In this section, we describe our privacy-preserving authentication and secure message
dissemination scheme.
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Table 2.2: Description of Notations used in this Chapter 2
Notation
TA
RTA
RSU
OBU
DSRC
CRL
MHT
MMPT
MHVs
E
P UT A , P RT A
P URT A , P RRT A
P URSU , P RRSU
P UV , P RV
IDRSU
P IDV
RIDV
Texp
Sk
CertV
signbyT A
signbyRT A
H
Ts
TmhtRoot
2.3.1

Description
Trusted Authority
Regional TA
Road Side Unit
On Board Unit
Dedicated Short Range Communications
Certificate Revocation List
Merkle Hash Tree
Modified Merkle Patricia Trie
Missing Hash Values
RSA 2048 bit Encryption Algorithm
Public and Private Keys of the TA
Public and Private Keys of RTA
Public and Private Keys of RSU
Public and Private Keys of Vehicle V
ID of RSU
Pseudo-ID of Vehicle V
Real ID of Vehicle V
Certificate expiration Time
Symmetric key between RSU and vehicle
Certificate of vehicle V
Signature of TA
Signature of RTA
SHA-256 hash function
Message generation timestamp
MHT root generation timestamp

System Initialization

When a vehicle V registers with its home RTA, the RTA encrypts a block containing the pseudo-ID P IDV , public key of the vehicle P UV , certificate expiration time
Texp , etc. with its private key P RRT A to generate a certificate CertV for V, where
CertV =E((P IDV , P UV , Texp , ...), P RRT A ). A vehicle sends a request for new certificate to the RTA whenever the current certificate is about to expire.
Each vehicle gets its P IDV , P UV , P RV , CertV , P URT A , and P UT A from its home
RTA securely. A vehicle uses its P IDV in all communications to preserve its privacy.
To protect privacy, many methods have been proposed in the literature [120, 85, 39,
98, 20, 113, 112, 127, 18] for changing pseudonym. Vehicles can use any of the existing
methods to change their pseudonym. The real identity of a vehicle V can only be
determined by its home RTA and the TA. The abbreviations used in this chapter are
listed in Table 2.2.
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2.3.2

Construction of MMPT for Storing Public Keys of Revoked Vehicles

The TA, RTAs, and RSUs use an MMPT to store public keys of revoked vehicles and
the ID of the RSU that has reported the vehicle to be malicious. Each leaf node in
the MMPT contains P UV of a revoked vehicle as key, while value contains the ID
of the RSU (IDRSU ) that has reported the vehicle as malicious. An RSU sends a
misbehaving report to the RTA whenever a malicious vehicle is found in its region.
Details regarding how a vehicle is determined to be malicious are not addressed in
this research. Many researchers have addressed the malicious node detection problem in Mobile Ad hoc NETworks (MANETs) and VANETs. RSUs can use any of
those mechanisms to detect malicious vehicles. After authenticating sender RSU
and checking the integrity of the received message, RTA revokes the certificate of the
malicious vehicle and inserts the P UV of the revoked vehicle along with IDRSU in
MMPT and also forwards this update to the TA. The RTA broadcasts this update to
all RSUs in its region as well. After receiving the update message, the TA and RSUs
add an entry of P UV of the revoked vehicle along with IDRSU to their respective
MMPTs. MMPT helps RSUs in determining quickly whether a vehicle’s public key
has been revoked, unlike CRL based revocation schemes.

2.3.3

Construction of MHT for Storing Public Keys of Registered RSUs

Each RTA constructs an MHT of the public keys of all RSUs registered under it. A
sample MHT of sixty four registered RSUs under an RTA is shown in Fig. 2.5, where
each leaf node stores the public key P URSU of one RSU registered under it. Initially,
an RTA sends the following information to each of the RSUs in its region:
• its own public key signed by the TA (P URT AsignbyT A ).
• root value of the MHT signed by the RTA (rootsignbyRT A ).
• corresponding MHVs (described below) that fall along the authentication path
of that RSU.
RT A → RSU : (E(P URT AsignbyT A , rootsignbyRT A , M HV s), P URSU ), where rootsignbyRT A
= (root of MHT || RSA signature of RTA || TmhtRoot )
MHVs corresponding to different RSUs in Fig. 2.5 are shown in Table 2.3. In the
proposed scheme, an RTA reconstructs MHT by discarding previous root of MHT and
TmhtRoot whenever a compromised RSU is found, and forwards the updated MHVs
and MHT root by signing it along with updated TmhtRoot to all the RSUs in its region.
Every RTA sends the MHT root generation timestamp (TmhtRoot ) to the TA whenever
it constructs or reconstructs the MHT. The TA broadcasts latest value of TmhtRoot
in the system to all RTAs, the RTAs in turn broadcast this value to all RSUs in its
region and the RSUs broadcast to vehicles within their transmission range.
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Table 2.3: Authentication Information
RSUi
RSU1
RSU2
RSU3
......
RSU33
......
RSU64

M HV s
H2 , H3,4 , H5,8 , H9,16 , H17,32 H33,64
H1 , H3,4 , H5,8 , H9,16 , H17,32 H33,64
H4 , H1,2 , H5,8 , H9,16 , H17,32 , H33,64
...........................
H34 , H35,36 , H37,40 , H41,48 , H49,64 , H1,32
...........................
H63 , H61,62 , H57,60 , H49,56 , H33,48 , H1,32

MHVs corresponding to the public keys of various RSUs in Fig. 2.5 under an RTA
are shown in Table 2.3.

Figure 2.5: Merkle Hash Tree of public keys of RSUs

2.3.4

When a Newly Registered Vehicle V Enters the Region of an RSU
under its Home RTA

Each RSU periodically broadcasts beacon messages containing its ID (IDRSU ) and
public key (P URSU ). When a vehicle V enters an area covered by an RSU, it retrieves
P URSU from the beacon message and sends an authentication request message to
verify the authenticity of P URSU . Firstly, a newly registered vehicle V sends an
authentication request message to the RSU containing its P IDV , P UV , CertV and
message generation timestamp (Ts ). After receiving the message, the RSU checks
the freshness of the message using Ts . Then the RSU retrieves the public key of the
vehicle from CertV and checks using MMPT if the vehicle’s public key P UV has been
revoked. RSU will drop the received message if any of the above verifications fails.
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After verification, RSU computes the hash value of P UV and a symmetric key Sk to
be used for secure communication between the vehicle and the RSU. When a vehicle
V moves from one RSU to another RSU both of which are under V’s home RTA, it
presents this hash value to the new RSU for authentication. RSU also generates a
group key Gk for sending messages to all vehicles within its region and updates the
group key periodically. RSU sends a response message to V containing P URT AsignbyT A ,
rootsignbyRT A , Gk , Sk , HashsignbyRSU , and MHVs corresponding to the public key of
the RSU along with the Ts , encrypted using the public key P UV of V as follows:
RSU → V : (E(P URT AsignbyT A , rootsignbyRT A , M HV s, Sk , HashsignbyRSU , Gk , Ts ),
P UV ), IDRSU , P IDV ), where
HashsignbyRSU = E(H(P UV , Sk ), P RRSU )
Upon receiving the above reply from the RSU, the vehicle uses received Ts to
verify freshness of the reply message. After that, it verifies the signature of the TA
and RTA. Then, V compares TmhtRoot in reply message with the stored TmhtRoot . If
the received TmhtRoot is greater than or equal to the stored TmhtRoot , then the vehicle
recalculates the root of MHT using the received MHVs and hash value of the public
key P URSU of the sender RSU received in the beacon message. Fig. 2.6 illustrates
the authentication process between a newly registered vehicle V and an RSU when V
enters the region of an RSU under its home RTA for the first time. Fig. 2.7 illustrates
the mutual authentication process between an RSU and a vehicle V when V moves
from the region covered by one RSU to the region covered by another RSU both of
which are under its home RTA.
For example, to authenticate the public key P URSU 2 of RSU2 retrieved from the
beacon message of RSU2 depicted in Fig. 2.5, hash values are computed in the following manner using the MHVs (H1 , H3,4 , H5,8 , H9,16 , H17,32 , H33,64 ) received in the
response message from RSU2 .
H1,2 = H(H(P URSU 2 ), H1 )
H1,4 = H(H1,2 , H3,4 )
H1,8 = H(H1,4 , H5,8 )
H1,16 = H(H1,8 , H9,16 )
H1,32 = H(H1,16 , H17,32 )
′

H1,64 = H(H1,32 , H33,64 )
′

Next, the computed root hash value H1,64 is compared with the root hash value
H1,64 (signed by the RTA) of the MHT, received in the response message from RSU2 .
′
If H1,64 = H1,64 , RSU2 is authenticated (i.e., the public key of RSU2 retrieved from
its beacon message is verified to be authentic); otherwise, authentication of RSU2
fails. Then V stores updated TmhtRoot after successful authentication of the RSU.
Next, V can send/receive messages encrypted using Sk /Gk to/from RSU.

35

Vehicle

RSU

)

Sends (PIDV , E((PUV,
CertV , Ts), PURSU))

Decrypts message
Checks Ts
Checks MMPT
Verifies PUV

If all valid
Decrypts message
Checks Ts
Verifies signature of TA and RTA
Checks MHT root generation time
Verifies MHT root

Sends (E(PURTAsignbyTA,
rootsignbyRTA, MHVs, Sk,
HashsignbyRSU, Gk, Ts), PUV ),
IDRSU, PIDV )

If all valid

Uses SK and GK to send and
receive message from RSU

Figure 2.6: Mutual Authentication between an RSU and a newly registered vehicle
V
2.3.5

When a Vehicle V Needs to Send a Message M to the Nearby RSU

When V wants to send a message M about an observed event to the nearby RSU, it
signs and encrypts M and sends it to the RSU as follows:
V → RSU: (E((M, SignmsgM , Ts ), Sk ), P IDV , IDRSU )
where SignmsgM = E(H(M ), P RV ), Ts is the timestamp, Sk is the symmetric key
established between V and RSU and P IDV is the pseudo-ID of V.
RSU uses Signature SignmsgM for establishing non-repudiation whenever a malicious vehicle is found. If V does not find an RSU within its transmission range to
send the message, it stores the message and carries it until it finds a nearby RSU.
After finding a nearby RSU, V and RSU authenticate each other and exchange shared
symmetric key and group key for communication. Then, V sends the message to the
RSU by encrypting it using the newly established symmetric key Sk as described
above. The above discussion is presented in detail in Algorithm 1.

2.3.6

When an RSU Receives a Message from a Vehicle V

When an RSU receives a message from a vehicle V about an observed event, it
decrypts the message using the symmetric key Sk established before and checks the
freshness of the message using Ts . It also determines the regions where the message
needs to be disseminated based on nature of the message. The possible message
dissemination scenario by RSU can be to-
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Vehicle

RSU

)

Sends (E((PUV , PURSUi,
Sk, HashsignbyRSUi, Ts),
PURSUj ), PIDV , IDRSUj )

Decrypts message
Checks Ts
Verifies HashsignbyRSUi
Checks MMPT
Verifies PUV
If all valid

Decrypts message
Checks Ts
Verifies signature of TA and RTA
Checks MHT root generation time
Verifies MHT root

Sends (E(PURTAsignbyTA,
rootsignbyRTA, MHVs, S′K,
HashsignbyRSUj, G′K, Ts), PUV ),
IDRSUj, PIDV )

If all valid

Uses S′K and G′K to send and
receive message from RSU

Figure 2.7: Mutual Authentication between an RSU and a vehicle when the vehicle
moves from the region of RSUi to the region of RSUj where RSUi and RSUj are
under the vehicle’s home RTA.
Algorithm 1: When a vehicle V observes an event
1 Case 1:
2 if V is within its transmission range of an authenticated RSU then
3
V sends message M about the observed event by encrypting M using Sk
as follows:
4
Sends (E((M , SignmsgM , Ts ) Sk ), P IDV , IDRSU ), where
SignmsgM = E(H(M ), P RV );
5 end if
6 Case 2:
7 if V does not find an RSU within its transmission range then
8
It stores the message and carries it until it finds an RSU within its
transmission range;
9
After finding an RSU, V and RSU authenticate each other;
10
Sends the message to the RSU as in Case 1 ;
11 end if

Case 1: all vehicles in its region,
Case 2: vehicles in other regions under its home RTA or other RTAs
Detailed description for message dissemination is given in Algorithm 2.
In case 1, RSU broadcasts the message to all vehicles within its transmission range
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Algorithm 2: When an RSU receives a message M from a vehicle V
1 Decrypts it using symmetric key Sk and retrieves the message M;
2 Checks the timestamp Ts ;
3 if Ts is valid then
4
Computes hash of the message M;
5
Encrypts computed hash value with its private key P RRSU ; HashmsgRSU :
E(H(M ), P RRSU );
6
Determines the regions where message requires dissemination;
7
Case 1:
8
if M needs to be disseminated to all vehicles in its region then
9
Encrypts the message with group key Gk and broadcasts (E((M ,
HashmsgRSU , Ts ), Gk ), IDRSU );
10
end if
11
Case 2:
12
if M needs to be disseminated to the vehicles in other regions covered by
its home RTA and/or other RTAs then
13
Encrypts the message using the public key of its home RTA and sends
it to its home RTA as follows:
14
Sends (E((M , HashmsgRSU , Ts ), P URT A ), IDRSU );
15
end if
16 end if

by encrypting it with group key Gk as follows:
RSU → Vehicles (within its transmission range): (E((M , HashmsgRSU , Ts ), Gk ),
IDRSU )
In case 2, the RSU sends the message to its home RTA for further dissemination as
follows:
RSU → RTA : (E((M , HashmsgRSU , Ts ), P URT A ), IDRSU )
Encrypting large messages using public key cryptography is not efficient.
In such cases, each RSU can establish a symmetric key between itself and
its home RTA for encrypting large messages.
2.3.7

When a vehicle V Moves from one RTA’s Region to Another RTA’s
Region

When a vehicle V moves from one RTA’s region to another RTA’s region, the RSU in
that region communicates through its home RTA with the home RTA of V to verify
the credentials of V. After verifying the credentials of V, RSU and V authenticate
each other and V obtains symmetric key and group key from RSU after mutual
authentication. Then V sends messages to the RSU using Algorithm1. When
RSU receives the message, it first checks timestamp Ts to ensure the freshness of the
message. After that, RSU disseminates the received message in a way similar to the
one described in Algorithm 2. The above discussion is presented in in detail in
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Algorithm 3: When a vehicle V moves from one RTA’s region to another
RTA’s region
1 RSU communicates with the home RTA of V through its own home RTA to
get the credentials of V;
2 if the credentials of V are valid then
3
Mutual authentication takes place between V and RSU;
4
V sends message to the RSU using Algorithm 1;
5
RSU uses Algorithm 2 to disseminate the message received from V;
6 end if

Algorithm3.
2.4

Analysis and Proof of Correctness of our Protocol

In this section, first we discuss how our protocol ensures security and supports scalability. Then, we present a formal correctness proof of our protocol using Burrows,
Abadi, and Needham (BAN) [19] logic and the PKI-based extended BAN Logic [96].
Next, we also present the results of correctness verification using SPAN (Security
Protocol ANimator) [50] and AVISPA (Automated Validation of Internet Security
Protocols and Applications) [7] tools.
2.4.1

Security Analysis

Conditional Privacy Preservation
The real identity of a vehicle in VANETs should not be traceable by attackers to
ensure privacy. However, a vehicle’s real identity needs to be revealed when a vehicle is determined to be malicious. In our scheme, only RTA and the TA know the
real ID of vehicles. A vehicle never uses its real ID to send messages. Each newly
registered vehicle gets a certificate to facilitate the authentication process. The certificate contains only pseudo-ID P IDV , public key P UV , and certificate expiration
time Texp . The vehicle encrypts the request message using the public key of RSU to
avoid traceability by an attacker. Only the corresponding RSU will be able to decrypt
this request message. After mutual authentication between vehicle and RSU, RSU
computes a symmetric key for secure communication between the vehicle and RSU.
After that, the vehicle uses this symmetric key to encrypt messages it sends to the
RSU. When a vehicle moves from one RSU to another nearby RSU under its home
RTA, it uses HashsignRSU signed by previous RSU to be authenticated by the nearby
RSU. A vehicle can use any of the many existing pseudonyms changing techniques
to change its pseudonym to protect privacy. The real identity of a vehicle cannot
be traced, even if RSUs are compromised, because only RTA and TA know the real
IDs of vehicles. RTA can reveal the real ID of a vehicle whenever it is found to be
malicious.
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Ensuring Message Integrity
In our protocol, RTA generates certificates for all vehicles registered under it. A
newly registered vehicle uses this certificate to get a symmetric key and group key
from an RSU. Later on, a vehicle uses HashsignbyRSU for authentication with a new
RSU (under its home RTA) and receives a new symmetric key as well as a new
group key for communication with that RSU. All messages from a vehicle to the RSU
are encrypted using the symmetric key shared between the RSU and the vehicle.
RSU can check the integrity and authenticity of the message using HashmsgV . RSU
disseminates this message by encrypting it with group key to other vehicles within
its region. Vehicles can also check the integrity of the received message from RSU
using HashmsgRSU . Thus, it prevents the modification of messages by unauthorized
or external attackers or internal attackers.
Resistance to Replay Attack
In case of a replay attack, attacker eavesdrops a transmitted message and re-transmits
it several times to create confusion. In our protocol, vehicles append message generation timestamp with each message and encrypt messages together with their timestamp. RSU checks the message’s freshness using the timestamp and disseminates it
to other vehicles in its region, and it’s home RTA with encrypted message generation
timestamp. Therefore, a replay attack is prevented for messages sent by vehicles as
well as RSUs.
Non-repudiation
In our protocol, each message from the sender contains the sender’s signature, and it
also contains ID (PID in case of vehicles) of sender and message generation timestamp.
A sender can never deny the action of sending the message because of the sender’s
signature. Besides, the sender cannot also deny the time of sending the message due to
encrypted message generation timestamp. Although real ID of vehicles is never used
for communication, RTA can track (based on PIDs) the real ID of a vehicle from the
message whenever any dispute occurs. Thus, our protocol supports non-repudiation.
2.4.2

Scalability of the Proposed Protocol

Distributed and Scalable Architecture
Our architecture has two layers, the upper layer and the lower layer. The upper layer
consists of TA and RTAs. Whereas, the lower layer consists of RSUs and vehicles. In
our system, TA is the root, while each RTA acts as a lower-level local TA. Vehicles
only need to store MHT root value and latest MHT root generation timestamp in the
system to verify the authenticity of RSUs. On the other hand, the TA, RTAs, and
RSUs use MMPT to store and search the public key of revoked vehicles efficiently.
Messages are disseminated through RSUs after authentication. Our architecture is
distributed and hence is scalable.
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Reduced Message Transmission Overhead
In many of the existing schemes, when a vehicle observes an event, this event is disseminated to every vehicle within its transmission range, which in turn is forwarded
to other vehicles using an underlying routing protocol. It can cause message transmission overhead due to the dissemination of the same event by several vehicles.
However, in our scheme, a vehicle sends messages to authenticated RSUs for further
dissemination. Only RSUs are responsible for disseminating messages to vehicles
within its transmission range and other relevant RSUs through their home RTAs. So,
RSUs can aggregate messages and prevent the propagation of redundant messages to
vehicles.
Overhead Involved in Authentication and Message Dissemination
In our scheme, an MHT based RSU authentication scheme is used. Each RTA maintains an MHT of registered RSUs under it and sends missing hash values along with
the latest MHT root generation timestamp to corresponding RSUs. A vehicle can
authenticate an RSU by using this missing hash values and latest MHT root generation timestamp without storing CRLs of revoked RSUs. The TA, RTAs, and RSUs
make use of an MMPT to store the public keys of revoked vehicles. In many of the
existing works in VANETs, vehicles require enough storage to store CRLs. The size
of CRLs increases as the number of revoked vehicles increase. It can cause significant
computation and storage overhead for each vehicle. Our scheme reduces this overhead
by not using CRLs; instead, it uses MHT and MMPT. Moreover, RSUs have more
computational capability than vehicles. RSUs are responsible for authentication of
vehicles within its transmission range and dissemination of messages to vehicles in its
region and to its home RTA for further dissemination. In addition to that, RSUs can
aggregate duplicate messages before further dissemination. So, message dissemination
is more scalable under our architecture.
2.4.3

Proof of Correctness of our protocol using BAN Logic

Borrows, Abadi, and Needham (BAN) logic [19] has been widely used to formally
verify the correctness of authentication protocols [67, 24, 33, 10, 62]. In this subsection, we present the formal verification of our proposed mutual authentication scheme
using BAN logic and the PKI-based extended BAN Logic [96]. Firstly, we present a
brief overview of the BAN logic in this subsection. Then, a formal idealization of the
proposed scheme, the initial assumptions, goals, and logical derivation to achieve the
goals using the inference rules for BAN logic in Appendix A are discussed.
BAN Logic Notation
Notations used in BAN logic to prove the correctness of our protocol are listed in
Table 2.4.
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Table 2.4: BAN logic notation
Notation
P |≡ X
P ◁X
P| ∼ X
P ⇒X

Description
P believes X
P sees X
P once said X
P controls X

S

P ←−
−k→ Q
#( X)
{X}k
( X) k
℘κ( P, KP )
Π( KP−1 )
σ( X, KP−1 )
P → Q : ℜ( X, ( X, Q) )
σ( ℜ( X, Q) , KP−1 )

P and Q share a secret key Sk
X is fresh
X is encrypted under the key k
X is hashed with the key k
P has public key KP
P has private key KP−1
X signed with private key KP−1
P sends X to the intended receiver Q
X signed with private key KP−1 for Q

Protocol Idealization
The messages exchanged between RSU and Vehicle to achieve mutual authentication
is idealized as follows:
• Simplified and idealized messages for mutual authentication between RSUi and
a newly registered vehicle V:
M1: V → RSUi : (P IDV , { KV , CertV ( Texp , ( P IDV , KV ) ) , Ts1 }KRSUi )
−1
M2: RSUi → V: (IDRSU , P IDV ,{σ(KRT A , KT−1A ), σ(M HT root, KRT
A ), M HV s,
S

−1
RSUi ←−
−k→ V , σ(ℜ((KV )Sk , all), KRSU
), Gk , Ts2 }KV )
i

• Simplified and idealized messages for mutual authentication when a vehicle
moves from RSUi to RSUj :
S

−1
M3: V → RSUj : (P IDV ,{KRSUi , RSUi ←−
−k→ V , σ(ℜ((KV )Sk , all), KRSU
),
i
Ts3 }KRSUj )
−1
M4: RSUj → V : (IDRSU , P IDV ,{σ(KRT A , KT−1A ),σ(M HT root, KRT
A ), M HV s,
S

′

′

−1
RSUj ←−
−k→ V , σ(ℜ((KV )S ′ , all), KRSU
), Gk , Ts4 }KV )
j
k

Initial Assumptions
In this scheme, the public key of TA (KT A ) is distributed to all RTAs, RSUs, and
Vehicles, and the private key (KT−1A ) is stored securely. Every RTA generates the public
−1
and private key pairs for each RSU (KRSU , KRSU
) and vehicle (KV , KV−1 ) registered
under it. A newly registered vehicle gets a certificate (CertV ) from its home RTA to
take part in VANET communication, where the certificate has certificate expiration
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time (Texp ) and the credential statement (st) (st contains P IDV and KV ). The initial
assumptions of the protocol is summarized as follows:
• A1: RT A| ≡ ℘κ( T A, KT A )
• A2: RT A| ≡ Π( KT−1A )
• A3: RSU | ≡ ℘κ( T A, KT A )
• A4: RSU | ≡ Π( KT−1A )
• A5: V | ≡ ℘κ( T A, KT A )
• A6: V | ≡ Π( KT−1A )
• A7: RSU | ≡ ℘κ( RT A, KRT A )
−1
• A8: RSU | ≡ Π( KRT
A)

• A9: V | ≡ ℘κ( RT A, KRT A )
−1
• A10: V | ≡ Π( KRT
A)

• A11: V | ≡ CertV ( Texp , st)
• A12: V | ≡ ∀x RT A ⇒ Certx
• A13: RSU | ≡ ∀x RT A ⇒ Certx
S

−k→ V
• A14: RSU | ≡ ∀S RSU ⇒ RSU ←−
S

• A15: V | ≡ ∀S RSU ⇒ RSU ←−
−k→ V
• A16: RSU | ≡ RT A ⇒ M HT root
• A17: V | ≡ RT A ⇒ M HT root
• A18: RSU | ≡ #( Tsi )
• A19: V | ≡ #( Tsi )
Goal of the Protocol
The goal of our protocol is to establish secure communication through mutual authentication between RSUs and Vehicles. The goals are illustrated as follows:
• G1: RSUi | ≡ KV
• G2: V | ≡ M HT root
S

• G3: V | ≡ RSUi ←−
−k→ V
S

• G4: RSUj | ≡ RSUi ←−
−k→ V
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Logic Derivation
We provide a formal proof of our proposed scheme based on logical postulates in
Appendix A and initial assumptions.
G1 can be deduced from M1 as follows:
• D1. RSUi ◁ (P IDV , { KV , CertV ( Texp , ( P IDV , KV ) ) , Ts1 }KRSUi ) ( From
R5(10) )
• D2. RSUi ◁ CertV ( Texp , ( P IDV , KV ) ) ( From D1 and R5(8) )
• D3. RSUi | ≡ # ( CertV ( Texp , ( P IDV , KV ) ) ) ( From R4 and A18 )
• D4. RSUi | ≡ RT A| ∼ ( CertV ( Texp , ( P IDV , KV ) ) ) (From A7, A8, and R1(1))
• D5. RSUi | ≡ RT A| ≡( P IDV , KV ) (From D3, D4, and R1(3) )
• D6. RSUi | ≡ KV ( From A13, D5, and R3 ) ............................................. (G1)
G2 and G3 can be deduced from M2 as follows:
• D7.

−1
V ◁ (IDRSU , P IDV ,{σ(KRT A , KT−1A ), σ( M HT root, KRT
A ), M HV s,
S

−1
RSUi ←−
−k→ V , σ(ℜ((KV )Sk , all), KRSU
), Gk , Ts2 }KV ) ( From R5(10) )
i
S

−1
• D8. V ◁ (σ(KRT A , KT−1A ), σ(M HT root, KRT
−k→ V , σ(ℜ((KV )Sk ,
A ), RSUi ←−
−1
all), KRSU
)) ( From D7 and R5(10) )
i

• D9. V ◁ σ(KRT A , KT−1A ) ( From D8 and R5(8) )
• D10. V | ≡ # (σ(KRT A , KT−1A )) ( From A17 and R4 )
• D11. V | ≡ T A| ∼ KRT A (From A5, A6, and R1(1) )
−1
• D12. V | ≡ # σ(M HT root, KRT
A ) ( From R4 and A19 )

• D13. V | ≡ RT A| ∼ M HT root ( From D11, A9, A10, and R1 in (1) )
• D14. V | ≡ RT A | ≡ M HT root ( From D13, R2, and R4 )
• D15. V | ≡ M HT root ( From D14, R4, and A17 ) ....................... (G2)
S

• D16. V ◁ (RSUi ←−
−k→ V , σ(ℜ((KV )Sk , all), KRSUi ) ( From D8 and R5(8) )
S

• D17. V | ≡ RSUi | ∼(RSUi ←−
−k→ V , (KV )
S

• D18. V | ≡ # (RSUi ←−
−k→ V , (KV )

Sk )

S

Sk )

( From D16, R5(9), and R1(4))

( From R4 and A19 )

• D19. V | ≡ RSUi | ≡ (RSUi ←−
−k→ V ) ( From D17, D18, R2 and R4 )
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S

• D20. V | ≡ (RSUi ←−
−k→ V ) ( From D19, A15 and R3 ) ................................(G3)
G4 can be deduced from M3 as follows:
S

−1
• D21. RSUj ◁ (KRSUi , RSUi ←−
−k→ V , σ(ℜ((KV )Sk , all), KRSU
), Ts3 ) ( From
i
R5(10) )
S

• D22: RSUj ◁ (RSUi ←−
−k→ V , (KV )

Sk )

S

( From R5(9) )

• D23: RSUj | ≡ # (RSUi ←−
−k→ V , (KV )

Sk )

( From A18 and R4 )

S

• D24: RSUj | ≡ RSUi | ∼(RSUi ←−
−k→ V , (KV )

Sk )

( From D21 and R1(4) )

S

• D25: RSUj | ≡ RSUi | ≡RSUi ←−
−k→ V ( From D23, D24, R2 and R4 )
S

• D26: RSUj | ≡ RSUi ←−
−k→ V ( From D25, A14 and R3 ) ......................... (G4)
G2 can also be achieved similarly from M4 using the following deduction.
−1
• D27. V ◁ (IDRSU j , P IDV ,{σ(KRT A , KT−1A ), σ(M HT root, KRT
A ), M HV s,
S

′
′

−1
), Gk , Ts4 }KV ) ( From R5(10) )
−k→ V , σ(ℜ((KV )S ′ , all), KRSU
RSUj ←−
j
k

S

′

−1
• D28. V ◁ (σ(KRT A , KT−1A ), σ(M HT root, KRT
−k→ V , σ(ℜ((PV )Sk ,
A ), RSUj ←−
−1
all), KRSU
)) (From D27 and R5(10))
j

• D29. V ◁ σ(KRT A , KT−1A ) ( From D28 and R5(8) )
• D30. V | ≡ # (σ(KRT A , KT−1A )) ( From A17 and R4 )
• D31. V | ≡ T A| ∼ KRT A ( From A5, A6, and R1(1) )
−1
• D32. V | ≡ # σ(M HT root, KRT
A ) ( From R4 and A19 )

• D33. V | ≡ RT A| ∼ M HT root ( From D31, A9, A10, and R1 in (1) )
• D34. V | ≡ RT A | ≡ M HT root ( From D33, R2, and R4)
• D35. V | ≡ M HT root ( From D34, R4, and A17 ) ........................... (G2)
It shows that vehicles and RSUs can use the shared secret key and group key after
mutual authentication through the above BAN analysis for secure communication.
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Figure 2.8: Message sequence chart of the proposed scheme using SPAN and AVISPA
tools

Figure 2.9: Message sequence chart of our scheme in the presence of an intruder

2.4.4

Proof of Correctness using Simulation Tools

SPAN (Security Protocol ANimator) [50] and AVISPA (Automated Validation of
Internet Security Protocols and Applications) [7] tools are widely used in the literature [2, 6, 78] to verify the security of an authentication protocol against replay attack,
man-in-the-middle attack, and impersonation attack. In this section, we present the
results of verification of security of our protocol using SPAN and AVISPA tools.
In our model, we consider three basic roles which we call regionalT A, rsu, and
vehicle, and are denoted by a, b, and c respectively. For verifying the security of
our scheme, a scenario consisting of four RSUs under one RTA is considered. Here,
ka represents the public key of the regionalT A, kb defines the public key of the rsu
that is to be authenticated by vehicle, the public key of other registered RSUs under
the regionalT A is represented by pk, kc denotes the public key of the vehicle, and
h represents the cryptographic hash functions. In the case of the proposed protocol,
regionalT A first activates the start signal and sends a message to rsu containing
MHVs for the corresponding rsu and the root hash value which is encrypted with its
private key inv(ka). The MHVs are used by vehicle to authenticate the rsu. Message
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sequence chart of the proposed scheme using SPAN and AVISPA tools is shown in
Fig. 2.8.
The message sequence chart in Fig. 2.9 shows that the intruder is able to only listen
and forward messages, but is unable to read and/or modify the messages. Sequence
of exchanged messages in the presence of intruder i is described below:
Step 1: The regionalT A initiates session and sends a message containing MHVs and
root value (encrypted with its private key inv(ka)) to the rsu.
Step 2: The intruder listens the message and passes it to the rsu.
Step 3: The rsu sends the received message along with a nonce to vehicle.
Step 4: The intruder views the message, but is unable to read as the message is encrypted using public key kc of vehicle. The intruder simply forwards the message to the vehicle.
Step 5: Upon receiving the message, vehicle retrieves the root value using public key ka
of the regionalT A. Next, it recalculates the root value using received MHVs in
received message to verify the rsu. After that it sends back the received nonce
along with another generated nonce to the rsu.
Step 6: The intruder simply listens the message and forwards it to the rsu.
Step 7: The rsu decrypts the message and sends back the received nonce to the vehicle.
Step 8: The intruder views the message and passes it to the vehicle.
2.5

Performance Evaluation

In this section, we compare the computation and communication overhead of our
protocol with that of ABAH [52] and LIAP [111].
2.5.1

Vehicle Authentication Overhead

In our scheme, each RSU, RTA, and the TA maintain an MMPT containing the
public key of revoked vehicles. When an RSU receives an authentication request
message from a vehicle, it looks up into the MMPT to check if the vehicle’s public
key P UV is present. If so, then the vehicle is determined to be malicious, and drops
the request message from the vehicle. For example, if NV denotes the total number
of the revoked vehicles, NP denotes the total number of pseudonyms a vehicle holds,
and NrevV denotes the size of the CRL, then the lookup operation in our scheme
takes O(logNV ) to find a revoked vehicle. So, computational complexity involved in
authenticating a vehicle in our approach is O(logNV ). On the other hand, each vehicle
in LIAP [111] scheme holds a long term certificate. In this scheme, each RSU uses a
linear search of vehicle certificate revocation list (VCRL) for authenticating vehicles.
So, complexity involved in authenticating a vehicle in LIAP [111] is O(NrevV ).

47

Vehicle authentication overhead (ms)

500

ABAH
LIAP
our scheme

400
300
200
100
0
0

10

20
30
40
number of revoked vehicles

50

Figure 2.10: Vehicle Authentication Overhead Comparison

In ABAH [52], each vehicle obtains enough pseudonyms from TA for communication. RSUs check the revocation status of the vehicle using CRL to avoid communicating with a revoked vehicle. If the pseudonym is present in the CRL, then the
message from the vehicle is dropped. However, when a malicious vehicle is found,
then all of its pseudonyms should be revoked. Thus, the total number of revoked
certificates under ABAH [52] is NrevV = NV × NP . Besides, The European standard ETSI TS 102 867 recommends changing a pseudonym every five minutes while
the American SAE J2735 standard recommends changing it every 120 s or 1 km,
whichever comes last [35].
Fig. 2.10 shows that the total cost for vehicle authentication under both ABAH
and LIAP increases linearly with increase in the number of revoked vehicles compared
to our proposed scheme. We set NP =10 in our comparison. The total computational
cost involved in the authentication of a vehicle in ABAH is significantly higher than
that of our scheme as well as LIAP.
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Figure 2.11: RSU Authentication Overhead comparison
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2.5.2

RSU Authentication Overhead

In our scheme, when a vehicle receives the response message from an RSU, first it
compares its stored value of TmhtRoot with that in the response message received from
the RSU. If the received value of TmhtRoot is greater than or equal to the stored value of
TmhtRoot , then the vehicle verifies the signature of TA and RTA to retrieve the root of
MHT from the received value. Next, the vehicle proceeds to validate the received root
value of MHT. The time required for verifying RSA 2048 signature is 0.16 ms, and
time required for computing SHA-256 hash is 111 MiB/s using Crypto++ 5.6.0 [31]
that runs on an Intel Core 2 1.83 GHz processor under Windows Vista in 32-bit mode.
Since the calculation of hash function incurs much less computation cost, the total
cost of an RSU authentication depends on RSA signature verification. Moreover, in
our scheme, computation and storage of certificates and CRL of RSUs are not required
for authentication. A vehicle only needs to store the public key of the TA and the
latest MHT root generation timestamp to authenticate RSUs. This approach is very
scalable. On the contrary, a vehicle needs to check the RSU certificate revocation list
(RCRL) using linear search to authenticate an RSU in LIAP [111]. In ABAH [52],
RSUs periodically broadcast their certificates for authentication. If the certificate of
an RSU is valid, then the vehicle successfully authenticates the RSU. However, they
did not consider the management of revoked RSUs in their scheme. So, we consider
only LIAP in Fig. 2.11 for comparing the overhead related to RSU authentication
with that of our scheme.
Fig. 2.11 shows that for the LIAP, the RSU authentication cost significantly increases with the increase in the number of revoked RSUs. On the contrary, in our
scheme, the authentication cost is considerably lower. For instance, when the number
of revoked RSUs reaches 30, the authentication overhead under LIAP is almost three
times that of our scheme.

Figure 2.12: Revocation message format that RTA sends to RSUs

2.5.3

Communication Overhead

In both ABAH and LIAP, the TA(Trusted Authority)/CA (Certificate Authority)
revokes the certificate of malicious vehicle and sends the updated CRLs of vehicles to
RSUs. Generally, a CRL consists of a header, the current date, the date of the last
update, the date of the next update, a complete list of revoked certificates which are
signed by the certificate issuer [73]. Each revoked certificate in the CRL consists of
20 bits of certificate serial number and 48 bits of revocation date. A Certificate serial
number is used to identify the revoked certificate. However, the CRL is expected to
contain thousands of revoked certificates along with a CRL header of 51 bytes and
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Figure 2.13: Comparison of communication overhead on RSU side

TA/CA’s signature of 60 bytes. It is found that CRLs are sent out very often, which
tend to be very large. Thus, CRLs introduce additional significant communication
overhead on RSU. In addition to that, congestion and overload of the network may
occur when RSUs synchronously try to download the latest CRL to authenticate
a vehicle. On the other hand, in our scheme, RTA sends a message to the RSUs
containing the revoked vehicle’s public key and ID of the RSU. So, in our scheme,
communication and computation overhead incurred by using CRLs for authentication
is reduced. The format of the revocation message about a vehicle, sent by an RTA
to the RSUs in its region, is given in Fig. 2.12.
Fig. 2.13 compares the communication overhead incurred by ABAH and LIAP
(both of which use CRLs), with our scheme. As can be seen from this figure, the
communication overhead on RSU in both ABAH and LIAP increases significantly
as the number of revoked vehicles increases while our scheme has almost constant
communication overhead (530 bytes) on RSU.
2.6

Summary

In this chapter, we presented a distributed and scalable privacy-preserving authentication and message dissemination scheme. Traditionally Certificates and CRLs were
used for authenticating entities. However, as the number of entities grows, using CRLs
for authentication incurs significant computation and communication overhead. Our
protocol addresses this issue. In our scheme, a vehicle only needs to store the public
key of the TA and the latest MHT root generation timestamp to authenticate RSUs.
Similarly, MMPT is used by RSUs to authenticate vehicles, thus reducing the complexity involved in authenticating vehicles. Our scheme successfully replaced CRLs
with two data structures MHT and MMPT, to reduce the communication and computation overhead related to the authentication of entities in VANET. We proved the
correctness of our protocol using formal methods as well as simulation. We also analyzed the computational and communication overhead of our protocol and compared
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it with that of two other protocols (ABAH and LIAP) presented in the literature. The
proposed scheme outperforms the ABAH and LIAP schemes in terms of computation
and communication overhead.
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Chapter 3 Low Overhead Privacy-preserving Authentication Scheme in
VANETs

In this Chapter, we present a cuckoo filter-based [37] lightweight authentication
scheme for VANETs. The cuckoo filter contains only one entry for all pseudonyms of
a revoked vehicle, thereby minimizing the overhead associated with CRL verification.
Our scheme provides an efficient lookup operation for both vehicles and Road Side
Units (RSUs) in a Vehicle to Infrastructure (V2I) scenario. Security analysis and
verification demonstrate that our protocol is robust against man-in-the-middle attacks, replay attacks, and impersonation attacks. Performance evaluation also shows
that our scheme has a significantly lower authentication overhead than other related
schemes.
3.1
3.1.1

Background
Cuckoo Filter

Cuckoo filter (CF) [37] is a probabilistic data structure that uses a cuckoo hash table
to speed up the set-membership test. Cuckoo filter stores fingerprint F (x) of an
element x instead of storing the original element x to improve space efficiency. A
basic cuckoo filter consists of a set of m buckets where each bucket stores n number
of entries. Each element x has two candidate buckets i and j determined by two hash
functions as follows:
i = H1 (x)= hash(x) mod m
j = H2 (x)= (H1 (x) ⊕ hash(F (x))) mod m
A sample cuckoo filter with eight buckets (m = 8), where each bucket has four
entries (n = 4) is shown in Fig. 3.1(a). The cuckoo filter calculates the fingerprint
F (x) of x to insert an element x. Two hash functions (H1 (x), H2 (x)) are used to
find the candidate buckets in the filter. If any of the two candidate buckets is free,
it inserts F (x) in the free bucket. If both of the candidate buckets are occupied,

Figure 3.1: (a) A cuckoo filter (b) Insertion operation.
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it randomly selects one of the buckets in the cuckoo filter and replaces the existing
fingerprint F (y) of the element y in the bucket with F (x). Later on, inserts the F (y)
in its alternate candidate bucket. If the bucket is not free, a fingerprint in one of the
buckets is displaced and repeats the above process until all the displaced fingerprints
are re-inserted in the cuckoo filter. We can find the alternate bucket location by
XORing the hash of the fingerprint of the element and its current bucket location.
In Fig. 3.1(b), while inserting an element x, it finds that both the candidate buckets
(bucket number 2 and bucket number 6) are occupied. Next, selects bucket number
6 randomly and replaces the existing element (”a”) in the bucket with F (x). The
cuckoo filter relocates the kicked out element (”a”) in its alternate candidate bucket
number 4 by displacing the existing item (”c”) in that bucket. After that, it re-inserts
the kicked-out item (”c”) in its alternate candidate bucket 1. To lookup, an element x,
first, it computes the fingerprint of the element F (x). Then, finds the two candidate
buckets using H1 (x) and H2 (x), and checks the fingerprint F (x) with the fingerprints
stored in these buckets. If any of the fingerprints match F (x), then the cuckoo filter
returns a positive result. Otherwise, it returns a negative result. To delete an element
x, firstly, the fingerprint F (x) is searched using the lookup operation. When F (x) is
found in one of the buckets, deletes F (x) from the cuckoo filter. The cuckoo filter
has a time complexity of O(1) for both lookup and delete operations.
3.2

System Model

In this section, we describe our system model, design goals, and initial assumptions.

Figure 3.2: Proposed system model for V2I authentication in VANET.
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3.2.1

System Model

Our system model depicted in Fig. 3.2 has four types of entities: Trusted Authority
(TA), Local Trusted Authorities (LTAs), Road Side Units (RSUs), and Vehicles.
• Trusted Authority(TA): TA is the root of the entire system. TA generates
its public and private key pairs (P UT A , P RT A ). Each entity knows the public
key of TA P UT A , while the private key P RT A is kept secret. TA also generates
the public and private key pairs (P ULT A , P RLT A ) for each LTA registered with
it.
• Local Trusted Authority (LTA): Each LTA acts as a local authority and is
registered with the TA. Each LTA is responsible for registering and generating
a pair of private and public keys for each RSU and vehicle registered under it.
• Road Side Unit (RSU): RSUs have a wider communication range than vehicles. RSUs are responsible for receiving and relaying messages from vehicles
within their transmission range.
• Vehicle: Each vehicle registers using its real identity with its home LTA in
VANET communication. The vehicle’s On-Board-Unit (OBU) is loaded with a
set of pseudonyms when it registers with an LTA. A vehicle uses its pseudonym
for communication and changes its pseudonym frequently using an underlying
algorithm to ensure message unlinkability. Vehicles can move from one LTA’s
region to another’s region. Once a vehicle enters a new LTA’s region, the
vehicle receives a new set of pseudonyms to communicate in the new region.
It is assumed that the LTAs in the different regions can securely communicate
with each other.
3.2.2

Design Goals

Our protocol has the following design goals:
• Privacy preservation: In VANETs, privacy is a major concern. Thus even
if all RSUs are compromised, it is necessary to protect the real identity of the
vehicle. Only the LTA under which the vehicle is registered knows the real
identity of vehicles in our proposed scheme. In the case of malicious vehicles,
the LTA can reveal the real identity to ensure secure communication.
• Low authentication overhead: Both vehicles and RSUs authenticate each
other before VANET communication in our scheme. Our scheme leverages
cuckoo filters to reduce the overhead related to using CRLs for authentication.
• Resilience to message tampering: Our goal is to ensure that messages come
from a legitimate source and messages are transmitted in a secure way.
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Table 3.1: Notation and Description of abbreviation used in this Chapter 3
Notation
TA
LTA
RSU
OBU
P UT A , P RT A
P ULT A , P RLT A
P URSU , P RRSU
P UV , P RV
ts
E
H
F
CF
Bndx
M HT
MF V s
M HTroot
ExpM HTroot

Description
Trusted Authority
Local TA
Road Side Unit
On Board Unit
Public and Private Keys of the TA
Public and Private Keys of LTA
Public and Private Keys of RSU
Public and Private Keys of vehicle V
Message generation timestamp
Encryption algorithm
SHA-256 hash function
Fingerprint
Cuckoo filter
Bucket index in positive cuckoo filter P CFV
Merkle Hash Tree
Missing Fingerprint Values of MHT for corresponding pseudonym of a Vehicle V
MHT root corresponding to a set of pseudonyms
of a Vehicle V
MHT root expired time

• Resilience to message replay attack: Attackers re-transmits the eavesdropped message several times to create confusion. In our protocol, both vehicles and RSUs append the message generation timestamp to each message to
resist the message replay attack.
3.2.3

Assumptions

The necessary assumptions include:
• TAs possess more computing, communication, and storage capacity than LTAs;
LTAs possess more computing, communication, and storage capacity than RSUs;
RSUs possess more computing, communication, and storage capacity than OBUs.
• Each LTA maintains separate MHT of the set of pseudonyms assigned to each
vehicle in its region.
• We assume that the clocks of TA, LTAs, RSUs, and vehicles are loosely synchronized (GPS can be used for this).

55

3.3

Our Proposed Scheme

Each vehicle registers with its home LTA to take part in VANET communication.
Upon registration, each vehicle’s OBU is loaded with a set of pseudonyms covering a
fixed longer period, such as two weeks, one month, or three months. A pseudonym
with a shorter lifetime provides higher unlinkability and more privacy. Our scheme
leverages Merkle Hash Tree (MHT) and Cuckoo filter for efficient authentication of
vehicles. The notations used in this chapter are listed in Table 3.1.
3.3.1

Construction of Merkle Hash Tree

In our scheme, each vehicle constructs an MHT of its set of pseudonyms. Fig. 3.3
shows a sample MHT of 128 pseudonyms assigned to a vehicle. In this MHT, every
leaf node stores a pseudonym and all non-leaf nodes are associated with a fingerprint
of cryptographic hash that is formed from the last thirteen bits of the hash of the child
node. We use the method in [86] to retrieve the missing fingerprint values (MFVs)
associated with a pseudonym of the vehicle P IDV to recalculate the M HTroot for
verification. The table 3.2 presents the MFVs corresponding to each pseudonym of
the vehicle in Fig. 3.3. Each LTA also maintains a separate MHT for each vehicle’s
set of pseudonyms in its region. LTA puts the expiry time ExpM HTroot for the set of
pseudonyms allocated to a vehicle in its region and the corresponding M HTroot in a
priority queue.
3.3.2

Construction of Cuckoo Filters for Vehicle Authentication

Each LTA constructs a positive cuckoo filter (P CFV ) and a negative cuckoo filter
(N CFV ) to facilitate the authentication of vehicles in its region. The insert, lookup,
and delete operations on P CFV and N CFV occur in the following circumstances:
When a vehicle registers with its home LTA
The LTA generates a set of pseudonyms and constructs Merkle Hash Tree (MHT) of
these pseudonyms for each vehicle registered with it. LTA also computes the finger-

Figure 3.3: A sample Merkle Hash Tree of pseudonyms of a vehicle.
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print of MHT root value F (M HTroot ) corresponding to every valid vehicle registered
under it and inserts the F (M HTroot ) into P CFV .
When the ExpM HTroot expires
The LTA uses the ExpM HTroot to check the priority queue periodically to determine
if there is an expired set of pseudonyms associated with a vehicle’s M HTroot in its
region. The priority queue is sorted by the ExpM HTroot . When the M HTroot value
corresponding to a vehicle expires, the LTA removes the expired M HTroot from the
priority queue. Next, the LTA looks up for F (M HTroot ), and deletes it from both
P CFV and N CFV .
When an LTA finds a malicious vehicle in its region
When a misbehaving vehicle is found in an LTA’s region, a misbehaving report is sent
to the LTA. The misbehaving report contains the pseudo ID of the sender P IDVsender
and pseudo ID of the misbehaving vehicle P IDVmalicious . On receiving the misbehaving
report, the LTA firstly verifies the validity of P IDVsender . If the LTA determines the
misbehaving vehicle as malicious, it deletes the F (M HTroot ) of the vehicle from the
positive cuckoo filter P CFV . Many methods have been proposed for identifying a
vehicle as malicious. LTA can use any of them to detect a malicious vehicle. After
that, LTA inserts the F (M HTroot ) of the malicious vehicle into the negative filter
N CFV .
When a vehicle leaves an LTA’s region
A vehicle sends a message that includes its current pseudo ID P IDv , MHT root of its
pseudonyms M HTroot , and the bucket index Bndx for F (M HTroot ) in positive cuckoo
filter before leaving an LTA’s region. When the LTA receives the message, it verifies
the credentials of the vehicle and deletes the vehicle’s corresponding F (M HTroot )
from P CFV .
Table 3.2: Authentication Information
P IDi
P ID1
P ID2
P ID3
P ID4
......
P ID64
......
P ID128

MFVs
F2 , F3,4 , F5,8 , F9,16 , F17,32 , F33,64 , F65,128
F1 , F3,4 , F5,8 , F9,16 , F17,32 , F33,64 , F65,128
F4 , F1,2 , F5,8 , F9,16 , F17,32 , F33,64 , F65,128
F3 , F1,2 , F5,8 , F9,16 , F17,32 , F33,64 , F65,128
...........................
F63 , F61,62 , F57,60 , F49,56 , F33,48 , F1,32 , F65,128
...........................
F127 , F123,126 , F121,124 , F113,120 , F97,112 , F65,96 , F1,64
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When a vehicle enters a new LTA’s region
When a vehicle enters a region covered by a new LTA, it requests a new set of
pseudonyms from the LTA. The request message contains the current pseudo ID of
the vehicle P IDv , MHT root of its pseudonyms M HTroot , and the ID of its previous
LTA. The new LTA communicates with the previous LTA through a secure connection
channel to verify the vehicle’s credentials. The previous LTA can look up its log table
and cuckoo filters for pseudonym verification. The new LTA generates a new set of
pseudonyms for the vehicle after successful verification. Next, the LTA constructs
an MHT of pseudonyms associated with the vehicle and inserts the fingerprint of the
MHT root F (M HTroot ) in the positive cuckoo filter P CFV .
3.3.3

Construction of Cuckoo Filters for RSU Authentication

In our scheme, LTA maintains a positive cuckoo filter P CFRSU of all valid RSUs
registered with it. When an RSU is compromised, LTA deletes the fingerprint of the
public key of the RSU from P CFRSU . After that, the LTA inserts the fingerprint of
the public key of the RSU into a negative cuckoo filter N CFRSU . LTA also inserts
the fingerprint of public key of every new RSU P CFRSU installed under its region in
a positive cuckoo filter P CFRSU .
3.4

V2I Authentication Phase

In our proposed authentication scheme, the LTA uses positive cuckoo filter P CFV to
store the fingerprint of MHT root F (M HTroot ) corresponding to every valid vehicle
in its region. The LTA also initializes a negative cuckoo filter N CFV to store the
fingerprint of MHT root F (M HTroot ) of malicious vehicle in its region. Each LTA
maintains a positive cuckoo filter P CFRSU of valid RSUs and a negative cuckoo filter
N CFRSU of compromised RSU in its region for efficient authentication. LTA signs
the Cuckoo Filters SigLT A(P CFRSU ,N CFRSU ) and SigLT A(P CFV ,N CFV ) , and periodically
broadcasts both the positive and negative cuckoo filter. Vehicles and RSUs use the
latest Cuckoo Filters to authenticate each other in V2I communication.
In our scheme, an RSU periodically broadcasts a beacon message. The beacon
message contains the ID of RSU IDRSUi , public key of the RSU P URSUi , and message
generation timestamp ts . When vehicle Vi receives the beacon message, it first checks
ts for freshness. After that, Vi computes the fingerprint of P URSUi and looks up into
the P CFRSU and N CFRSU . Vi verifies the validity of P URSU using the Algorithm 4.
After authenticating the P URSUi , Vi sends a message to the RSUi for mutual
authentication. The message contains the pseudo-ID of sender vehicle P IDVi , missing
fingerprint values M F V s to calculate the root value corresponding to Vi ’s set of
pseudonyms, index of the bucket Bndx in positive cuckoo filter P CFV , ID of the
RSUi IDRSUi , and message generation timestamp ts . Vi encrypts the message using
the public key P URSUi of the RSUi . When RSUi receives the message from Vi , it first
decrypts the message using its private key P RRSUi . Next, it checks the freshness of
the message using ts . If the message is fresh, then the RSUi recalculates the MHT
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Algorithm 4: Vi authenticates P URSUi
1 RSU periodically broadcasts beacon message (IDRSUi , P URSUi , ts )
2 Upon receiving the beacon message Vi verifies P URSUi as follows
3 Checks the freshness of the received message using ts ;
4 if ts is valid then
5
Looks up into the positive CF P CFRSU and negative CF N CFRSU for
F (P URSUi ) ;
6
if F (P URSUi ) ∈ P CFRSU then
7
if F (P URSUi ) ∈
/ N CFRSU then
8
P URSUi is considered valid;
9
else
10
P URSUi sends message to LTA for verification ;
11
end if
12
end if
13
if F (P URSUi ) ∈
/ P CFRSU then
14
if F (P URSUi ) ∈ N CFRSU then
15
P URSUi is considered malicious;
16
else
17
Vi waits for updated CFs from LTA;
18
end if
19
end if
20 else
21
Drops the beacon message;
22 end if

root value corresponding to the Vi using the received M F V s and P IDVi . After that,
RSUi checks if the fingerprint of the MHT root value F (M HTroot ) exists in the bucket
index Bndx in the positive cuckoo filter P CFV and F (M HTroot ) exists in the negative
cuckoo filter N CFV . A detailed description of the authentication process is presented
in Algorithm 5.
Table 3.3 presents the four possible cases of the query results of positive and
negative cuckoo Filter(CF). A receiver determines whether the sender is valid or not
using the results of both positive and negative cuckoo filters in Table 3.3.
3.5

Performance Analysis and Comparison

In this section, firstly, we analyze the security of our proposed authentication scheme.
Next, we verify the security of our scheme against replay attack, man-in-middle attack, and impersonation attack using SPAN (Security Protocol ANimator) [50] and
AVISPA (Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications) [7]
tools. After that, we compare our scheme’s authentication overheads with that of
LIAP [111], NERA [9], and HDMA [109] schemes.

59

Algorithm 5: Authentication of Vi by RSUi
1 Vi sends E((P IDVi , M F V s, Bndx , P UVi , IDRSUi , ts ), P URSUi ) to RSUi
2 Upon receiving the above message RSUi verifies Vi as follows
3 Decrypts the message using private key P RRSUi ;
4 Checks the freshness of the received message using ts ;
5 if ts is valid then
6
Calculates the M HTroot value using MFVs and P IDVi ;
7
Looksup into the positive cuckoo filter P CFV with Bndx and negative
cuckoo filter N CFV for F (M HTroot ) corresponding to Vi ;
8
if F (M HTroot ) ∈ P CFV with Bndx then
9
if F (M HTroot ) ∈
/ N CFV then
10
Vi is considered valid;
11
else
12
RSUi sends message to LTA for verification ;
13
end if
14
end if
15
if F (M HTroot ) ∈
/ P CFV with Bndx then
16
if F (M HTroot ) ∈ N CFV then
17
Vi is considered malicious;
18
else
19
RSUi waits for updated CFs from LTA;
20
end if
21
end if
22 else
23
Drops the received message;
24 end if

3.5.1

Security analysis

Mutual authentication:
In our scheme, both vehicles and RSUs authenticate each other using cuckoo filter before VANET communication. The V2I mutual authentication makes VANET
communication more secure.
Table 3.3: Possible Cases and Results with Cuckoo Filter
Case
1
2
3
4

Positive CF
True
False
False
True

Negative CF
False
True
False
True

Conclusion
Valid
Malicious
Filters have not been updated
Forwards to LTA for verification
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Identity anonymity:
Vehicles use pseudonyms for communication in our scheme. A vehicle’s home LTA
only knows its real ID. Therefore, even if all RSUs are compromised, the real ID of a
vehicle is still secure.
Resistance to message modification attack:
Vehicles authenticate the public key of the RSUs received in the beacon message.
Then, vehicles encrypt messages using the public key of RSU for mutual authentication. Since the attackers do not know the private key of RSUs, only the intended
RSUs can read/modify the messages.
Resistance to replay attack:
In our scheme, both vehicles and RSUs append message generation timestamps with
the messages. Upon receiving the messages, the receivers first check the message
generation timestamp to resist replay attack. We assume that the clocks of RSUs
and vehicles are loosely synchronized (this can be done using GPS).
3.5.2

Verification using SPAN and AVISPA tools

We verify the security of our protocol using SPAN and AVISPA tools [7]. Our model
consists of three basic roles : rsu, localT A, and vehicle, and are denoted by a, b, and
c respectively. In our model, we use ka, kb, and kc to represent the public keys of the
rsu, localT A, and vehicle respectively, and h represents the cryptographic hash function. Here, localT A first activates the start signal. vehicle gets a set of pseudonyms
and the bucket index nonce-5 in the positive cuckoo filter (P CFv ) from the localT A.
vehicle sends its current pseudonym nonce-1, Missing Fingerprint Values, and bucket
index nonce-5 for V2I authentication. Fig. 3.4 presents the message sequence chart
of our proposed scheme generated by SPAN and AVISPA tools.
Fig. 3.5 shows the message sequence chart in the presence of an intruder. It is
evident from the sequence chart that the intruder cannot read or modify the messages.

Figure 3.4: Message sequence
chart of our scheme using SPAN
and AVISPA tools.

Figure 3.5: Message sequence
chart of our scheme in the presence of an intruder.
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The intruder only listens and forwards the messages. We describe the sequence of
exchanged messages in the presence of an intruder i as follows:
Step 1: The localT A initiates session and sends a message containing the vehicle’s set
of pseudonyms and the bucket index nonce-5 in P CFv to the vehicle.
Step 2: Since the intruder does not know the private key of the vehicle, the intruder
only listens to the message.
Step 3: The vehicle sends the received nonce-5, its current pseudonym nonce-1, and
M F V s along with a nonce to the rsu.
Step 4: The intruder is unable to read and/or modify the message as it is encrypted
using public key ka of rsu. The intruder only views the message and passes it
to the rsu.
Step 5: rsu decrypts the received message using its private key inv(ka). Next, it recalculates the M HTroot value using the received M F V s. After that, it looks
up into P CFv with nonce-5 and also searches N CFv for M HTroot . rsu sends a
new nonce to the vehicle, along with the received nonce after verification.
Step 6: The intruder only listens the message and passes it to the vehicle.
Step 7: The vehicle retrieves the nonces by using its private key kc and sends back the
received nonce to the rsu.
Step 8: The intruder is only able to view the message but unable to read or modify it.
He/she passes the message to the rsu.
3.5.3

V2I Authentication Overheads Analysis

In our scheme, a vehicle looks up into the P CFRSU and N CFRSU to verify the public
key of RSU received in RSU’s beacon message. After that, the vehicle sends a message
to the RSU that includes the P IDV , M F V s, and Bndx in P CFV . RSU recalculates
the M HTroot using the M F V s and looks up into the cuckoo filter with Bndx in P CFV
for authentication. On the other hand, both vehicles and RSUs check Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) to authenticate each other in LIAP [111]. In NERA [9], RSUs
check the CRL that contains the real ID of malicious vehicles to authenticate vehicles.
In both LIAP [111] and NERA [9], bilinear pairing and Map-To-Point operations are
used, which is costly. RSUs look up whether the pseudonym of vehicles is added
in the CRL in HDMA scheme [109] for V2I authentication. A comparison of the
authentication overheads of our scheme with LIAP, NERA, and HDMA schemes is
presented in Table 3.4. In Table 3.4, TRSA E represents the time for RSA-1048 bit encryption operation, TRSA D refers the decryption operation time of the RSA-1048 bit
algorithm , TRSA V represents RSA 1048 Verification time, SHA-256 hash operation
time is represented by H, n denotes the number of pseudonyms assigned to a vehicle,
TM U L denotes the time for performing one point multiplication, TM T P denotes the
time for performing a MapToPoint hash operation, and TP AR denotes the time for
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Table 3.4: V2I Authentication Overheads
Schemes
LIAP
HDMA
NERA
Proposed authentication scheme

Vehicle’s Side
TM U L +TM T P +3TP AR
TRSA V +TRSA D
TM U L +TM T P +3TP AR
TRSA E

RSU’s Side
TM U L +TM T P +3TP AR
TRSA V +TRSA D +TRSA E
TM U L +TM T P +3TP AR
(logn + 1)H+TRSA D

performing a pairing operation. In both LIAP [111] and NERA [9], computation overhead is TM U L +TM T P +3TP AR (where, TM U L = .39 ms, TM T P =.09 ms and TP AR =3.21
ms). The required calculation time for TRSA E =.08 ms, H=111 MiB/s, TRSA D =1.46
ms, and TRSA V =.07 ms using Crypto++ 5.6.0 [31] that runs on an Intel Core 2 1.83
GHz processor. Fig. 3.6 shows the comparison of authentication overhead of vehicles
on RSU in the proposed scheme with that of LIAP [111], NERA [9], and HDMA [109].
There is a significant increase in computation cost with the increased number of vehicles in both LIAP and NERA. On the contrary, the vehicle authentication cost
is low under HDMA and very low under the proposed authentication scheme. It is
observed in Fig. 3.7 that our proposed authentication scheme has significantly lower
RSU authentication overhead compared to LIAP, NERA, and HDMA. For example,
when the number of RSUs reaches 30, the computation cost is approximately 115 ms
for both LIAP [111] and NERA [9] and 45 ms for HDMA [109], whereas it is only 2.4
ms for the proposed authentication scheme.

Figure 3.6: Computation overhead on RSU for authentication.
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Figure 3.7: Computation overhead on vehicle for authentication.

3.6

Related Works

The necessity of removing compromised or misbehaving entities from the VANET is
widely accepted because such entities can compromise communication security and
harm transportation efficiency. Many of the existing privacy-preserving authentication schemes [71, 118, 51, 142] in VANET use Certificate Revocation Lists to store
the information of revoke entities. However, the size of CRL increases significantly
with the increased number of revoked entities, which adds computation and communication overhead for verification. A vehicle requires 43,800 pseudonyms annually
(3,600 pseudonyms per month) if it changes its pseudonym every minuteet al.’s [88].
When a vehicle is found to be malicious, certificates of all the unexpired pseudonyms
of a vehicle are added to CRL. Therefore, the size of CRL grows linearly with the
number of revoked pseudonyms.
Zhu et al. [142] proposed a privacy-preserving authentication scheme based on
group signature [25] to address the computational and storage overhead caused by
CRLs. They divided a region into several domains, and an RSU is responsible for
authenticating vehicles in its domain. Vehicles receive group keys for hash message
authentication code (HMAC) computation to facilitate message authentication. This
scheme assumes RSUs are trustworthy. However, malicious entities can pose as RSUs
to steal sensitive information from vehicle owners [74].
Wang and Yuo [111] proposed a local identity-based anonymous message authentication protocol (LIAP) for VANET. In this scheme, CA (Certificate Authority)
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generates long-term certificates for both vehicles and RSUs to facilitate mutual authentication. CA also maintains and distributes the Certificate Revocation List of
RSUs (RCRL) and vehicles (VCRL). Each vehicle and RSU checks RCRL and VCRL
for V2I authentication. However, the CRL checking process causes computation and
storage overheads. Wang et al. [109] proposed a hybrid D2D message authentication
(HDMA) scheme for 5G enabled VANETs. In this scheme, each vehicle gets a set
of pseudonyms and corresponding certificates from CA. When a vehicle enters an
RSU’s or RSBS’s (Road Side Base Station) region, it sends a pseudonym certificate
to the RSU or RSBS for authentication. The RSU or RSBS lookups CRL list to check
whether the pseudonym has been revoked. A zero-knowledge proof algorithm is used
in this scheme for V2I authentication. Bayat et al. [9] proposed an efficient RSUbased authentication scheme using bilinear pairing and Map-To-Point operation. In
this scheme, a vehicle joins an RSU’s region to take part in VANET communication.
RSU generates a set of pseudo-IDs and the corresponding secret keys for each vehicle
within its region after the mutual authentication. In this scheme, only the real IDs
of malicious vehicles are added to CRLs, reducing the size of CRLs compared to traditional CRLs. However, message generation timestamps are not attached to every
message in this scheme. As a result, it is susceptible to replay attacks.
In recent years, many of the research works[29, 60, 80, 122] on VANET use cuckoo
filter (CF) [37] due to its efficient computational performance. Cui et al. [28] proposed an edge computing-based message authentication scheme in VANET using a
cuckoo filter. In this scheme, RSU selects a number of vehicles as edge computing
vehicles (ECVs) in its region. The ECVs assist RSU in authenticating the message
signature sent by different vehicles within the RSU’s region. RSU verifies the authentication result received from the ECVs. A cuckoo filter is then used to broadcast the
authentication information to all vehicles in the RSU’s region. Vehicles only need to
query the cuckoo filter to verify the authenticity of a received message, which reduces
the authentication overhead. Zhang et al. [132] proposed an efficient pseudonym certificate revocation scheme in VANET using a cuckoo filter. In this scheme, CA stores
the fingerprints of the certificates of all unexpired pseudonyms of all revoked vehicles
in a cuckoo filter. CA broadcasts the cuckoo filter to the network to facilitate the
authentication process. This scheme significantly reduces the computation overhead
compared to the traditional CRLs. Since the CA puts all unexpired pseudonyms into
a cuckoo filter, this can add storage and computation overhead.
Motivated by the above drawbacks of the authentication schemes, we propose a
lightweight privacy-preserving authentication scheme using cuckoo filters in VANETs.
In our scheme, only a single entry (M HTroot corresponding to a vehicle’s set of
pseudonyms) for all pseudonyms of a revoked vehicle is placed into the cuckoo filter,
which significantly reduces the overhead for verification related to CRL. Our scheme
provides an efficient lookup operation for both vehicles and RSUs in V2I authentication.
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3.7

Summary

In this chapter, we presented a lightweight privacy-preserving V2I authentication
scheme based on cuckoo filters. The use of cuckoo filters reduces the storage, communication, and computation overhead in contrast to Certificate Revocation Lists
(CRLs) based solution for authentication. We showed that our proposed authentication scheme meets the basic security requirements in VANETs through security
analysis and verification. Performance evaluation of the proposed scheme shows that
it performs better than some of the other related schemes.
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Chapter 4 Efficient Management of Pseudonyms for Privacy-preserving
Authentication in VANETs

In this chapter, we present CREASE, a Certificateless and REused-pseudonym based
Authentication Scheme for Enabling Privacy in VANETs that uses Merkle Hash Tree
(MHT) and Modified Merkle Patricia Trie (MMPT) to store and manage vehicles’
pseudonyms efficiently. One significant advantage of our proposed scheme is that it
enables all vehicles to change their pseudonyms frequently based on a pseudonym
expiration time and to reuse their pseudonyms in a secure way. We also propose an
efficient pseudonym status update mechanism that speeds up the pseudonym changing frequency to avoid traceability. A detailed security analysis is carried out to
demonstrate the effectiveness of our scheme. SPAN and AVISPA tools are used to
verify the security of our proposed protocol against replay attack, man-in-the-middle
attack, and impersonation attack. Besides, a formal security proof using BAN logic
is presented. Results show that our scheme outperforms contemporary NERA [9],
ASPA [4], and LIAP [111] schemes in terms of security features and protocol overhead.
4.1

Related Works

The security and privacy problems in VANETs have attracted great attention from
researchers in both academia and industry. Many privacy preserving authentication
schemes that include pseudonym-based schemes, group signature-based schemes, IDbased schemes, symmetric cryptography-based schemes, and anonymous certificate
based schemes have been proposed in recent years.
The pseudonym-based schemes mostly use Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). Raya
and Hubaux [88] proposed a pseudonymous scheme, where the CA generates publicprivate key pairs and corresponding certificates for vehicles. In this scheme, each
vehicle requires to preload a huge quantity of public-private key pairs and corresponding public-key certificates. Next, the vehicle selects one of the certificates to
sign a message in each communication. This scheme provides message authentication and conditional privacy-preservation. However, a huge storage space is needed to
store keys and corresponding certificates of all vehicles, while the certificate authority
also needs to store certificates of all vehicles.
Jiang et al. [52] proposed an anonymous batch authentication scheme(ABAH)
based on hash message authentication code (HMAC). In this scheme, they divide a
large area into several domains, and each RSU manages the vehicles in its domain in
a localized manner. TA generates enough pseudonyms for each vehicle to take part in
VANET. Vehicles use pseudonym to send a join request to an RSU. The RSU checks
the revocation status of the vehicle’s pseudonym in the CRL for authentication. Next,
the RSU sends a group key to the authentic vehicle. In this scheme, vehicles calculate
HMAC using the group key and include it in the safety-related messages for secure
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communication. However, the revocation status checking process using the CRL of
vehicles incurs overhead.
Wang and Yuo [111] proposed a local identity-based anonymous message authentication protocol (LIAP) using bilinear pairing. In this scheme, both vehicles and
RSUs get long-term certificates from CA (Certificate Authority) during registration.
A vehicle uses its long-term certificate when it enters an RSU’s region for authentication. The RSU checks the stored certificate revocation list of vehicles (VCRL)
to authenticate the vehicle. Similarly, vehicles also authenticate the RSU using the
certificate revocation list of RSUs (RCRL). After mutual authentication, vehicles get
keys from RSUs to generate pseudonyms for V2V communication. However, the CA
still needs to distribute the certificate revocation list of RSUs (RCRL) and vehicles
(VCRL) in this scheme.
Paruchuri and Durresi [83] proposed a certificate-based scheme that uses smart
cards to provide anonymous authentication. The smart card stores vehicle’s real
identity, certificate, and required cryptographic keys. In this scheme, a vehicle uses
its certificate to authenticate itself to an RSU for receiving and sending messages.
The RSU generates a session key and sends it to all the vehicles that have been
authenticated by it. Authentic Vehicles under an RSU share the same session key for
communication. The Vehicles do not need to store the computation-intensive CRLs.
However, they did not discuss how the RSUs share the information of misbehaving
vehicles to verify the authenticity of the vehicles.
Ali et al. [4] proposed a pseudonym-based authentication scheme that allows vehicles with a valid pseudonym for communication. In this scheme, firstly, a vehicle
gets an initial pseudonym from Vehicular Manufacturing Company (VMC) using the
VMC’s pre-loaded secret key. Next, it gets a long term certificate (LTC) from the
Certificate Authority (CA), which is used by the LTC Authority to issue a Pseudonym
Certificate (PC) for the vehicle. Then, a vehicle requests for pseudonyms from the
Pseudonym Provider (PP) directly or through RSUs. PP sends multiple pseudonyms
to the vehicle and they are all valid at the same time interval. However, this scheme
is not secure against Sybil attacks as multiple pseudonyms of a vehicle are valid at
the same time interval. Besides, CA checks the credentials of the vehicle in CRL for
authentication.
Most of the existing pseudonym based schemes [79, 66, 127, 124] mainly focus
on the frequency of pseudonym change that is most effective, or the best situation
for changing pseudonyms. To the best of our knowledge, existing schemes did not
address the efficient management of pseudonyms while preserving privacy for authentication. Our scheme provides an efficient privacy-preserving authentication scheme
that considers the efficient management of pseudonyms to address the challenges
mentioned above. In CREASE, each RSU maintains an MHT combined with MMPT
to store the vehicles’ pseudonym efficiently and allow vehicles to reuse pseudonyms
securely from their stored set of pseudonyms. Moreover, our scheme helps in replacing certificate revocation lists (CRLs) with two data structures, Merkle Hash Tree
(MHT) and Modified Merkle Patricia Trie (MMPT), to reduce the overhead involved
in authentication.
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TA

RTA

TA: Trusted Authority
RTA: Regional Trusted Authority
RSU: Road Side Unit
OBU:On Board Unit
V2I: Vehicle to Infrastructure
V2V:Vehicle to Vehicle
RTA

RTA

RSU

RSU
V2I Communication
OBU

V2V Communication

Figure 4.1: Proposed VANET architecture for CREASE

4.2
4.2.1

System Model
System Model

Prior to presenting the proposed CREASE scheme, we briefly introduce our system
model and its components shown in Fig. 4.1. Our system model has two layers-1)
the Upper layer and 2) the lower layer. The Trusted Authority (TA) and Regional
Trusted Authorities (RTAs) constitutes the upper layer, and the lower layer consists
of RSUs and OBUs. The TA is the root of the whole system, while each RTA acts
as a lower-level local TA for its region. Table 4.1 presents the notations used in this
section.
In CREASE, the TA generates its own public and private key pairs (P UT A , P RT A ).
Each RTA is registered with the TA and gets its public and private key pairs (P URT A ,
P RRT A ) from the TA. The RTA acts as a local TA and is responsible for generating
public and private key pairs for each vehicle and RSU registered with it. Each RTA
maintains a Merkle Hash Tree (MHT) [72] of all RSUs registered with it.
Each vehicle is registered with its home RTA to participate in VANET. When a
vehicle registers with its home RTA, its On Board Unit (OBU) is loaded with its
public-private key pairs (P UV , P RV ), a set of pseudonyms {P ID1 , ..., P IDn }, and
an initial pseudonym P IDinitial signed by its home RT A (E(H(P IDinitial )||texp ),
P RRT A ) during registration, where P IDinitial ∈ {P ID1 , ..., P IDn } and texp is the
expiration time of P IDinitial . The OBU also stores MHT root generation timestamp
(TmhtRoot ) generated and assigned by the RTA as well as the public key of the TA
(P UT A ). To preserve it privacy, a vehicle never uses its real identity in its communications. There are various approaches for generating and and assigning pseudonyms
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for vehicles [85, 39, 113, 112]. However, we do not address this issue in this research.
4.2.2

Basic Idea

In CREASE, each vehicle registers with its home RTA with its real ID to take part
in VANET. Each RTA generates and assigns pseudonyms for all vehicles registered
with it. The vehicle’s OBU is loaded with its public-private key pair, the set of
pseudonyms, and an initial pseudonym signed by its home RTA during registration.
RTAs also send the registered vehicle’s pseudonyms to all RSUs in its region using a secure protocol such as Transport Layer Security (TLS). RSUs in our scheme
maintain MMPT combined with an MHT to facilitate the efficient management and
authentication of pseudonyms of vehicles (how this is done is explained later). When
a vehicle enters an area covered by an RSU for the first time after registration, it
uses the credentials in the RSU’s beacon message to authenticate the public key of
the RSU. Upon successful authentication of the public key of the RSU, the vehicle
sends its public key and initial pseudonym signed by its home RTA to authenticate
itself. After mutual authentication, RSU sets a new pseudonym expiration time for
the initial pseudonym and generates a symmetric key for encrypting and decrypting messages between RSU and the vehicle. The RSU also generates a group key
Table 4.1: Notation and Description of abbreviations used in this Chapter 4
Notation
TA
RTA
RSU
OBU
E
P UT A , P RT A
P URT A , P RRT A
P URSU , P RRSU
P UV , P RV
IDRSU
P IDVi nitial
P IDVcurr
P IDVnew
texp
tnew
′
tnew
ts
signbyT A
signbyRT A
H
M HT
M HV s

Description
Trusted Authority
Regional TA
Road Side Unit
On Board Unit
Encryption algorithm
Public and Private Keys of the TA
Public and Private Keys of RTA
Public and Private Keys of RSU
Public and Private Keys of vehicle V
ID of RSU
Initial pseudonym assigned to Vehicle V
Pseudonym currently used by Vehicle V
New Pseudonym activated for Vehicle V
Initial Pseudonym Expiration Time of V
Current Pseudonym Expiration Time of V
Newly Actived Pseudonym Expiration Time of V
Message generation timestamp
Signature of TA
Signature of RTA
SHA-256 hash function
Merkle Hash Tree
Missing Hash Values of MHT for corresponding RSU
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to be used by all vehicles within its region for vehicle to vehicle (V2V) communication. Next, the RSU sends the new pseudonym expiration time, the symmetric
key, and the group key to the vehicle using DSRC standard protocol. RSUs assist
vehicles in their region to change their pseudonym by providing a pseudonym expiration time associated with the pseudonym. CREASE allows vehicles to reuse their
pseudonym without interrupting communication. When the validity time of a vehicle’s current pseudonym is about to expire, the vehicle will again communicate with
its RSU to activate a new pseudonym from a pool of pseudonyms received from its
home RTA during initial registration. This pseudonym changing strategy speeds up
the pseudonym changing frequency to avoid traceability of the vehicle. These steps
involved in the authenticated communication process is depicted in Fig. 4.1.
4.2.3

Assumptions

We make the following assumptions in this work:
1. Each vehicle knows P UT A and P URT A of the RTA under which it is registered.
These are loaded into the vehicle’s On Board Unit (OBU) during its initial
registration with an RTA.
2. RTA generates and assigns a pool of pseudonyms for each vehicle registered
under it.
3. Each RTA constructs an MHT of the public keys of RSUs that are registered
with the RTA (described below). It then distributes the corresponding MHVs
(described below) to each RSU in its region.
4. Each RSU maintains the MHT accompanied by MMPT to manage the pseudonyms
of vehicles efficiently. RSU also distributes the symmetric key Sk and group key
Gk securely to the vehicles in its region for communication.
5. RSUs registered under the same RTA know the public keys of each other.
6. Vehicle’s OBU is tamper resistant and has enough storage capacity to store a
large set of pseudonyms. This is not a serious restriction considering the current
hardware capabilities.
7. The clocks of all entities (TA, RTAs, RSUs, and Vehicles (OBUs) ) are loosely
synchronized. This synchronization can be done using GPS.

4.2.4

Construction of Modified Merkle Patricia Trie for Efficient Management of Vehicle’s Pseudonyms

Next we explain how an RSU uses an MMPT to store the pseudonyms (in hexadecimal
representation) of a vehicle along with their status. Table 4.2 contains a sample list
of four pseudonyms of a vehicle and their current status. Fig. 4.2 shows the MMPT
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Figure 4.2: Modified Merkle Patricia Trie for storing the contents of Table 4.2

storing these four pseudonyms along with their status. In the MMPT, the root node
is an extension node that contains the shared nibble bf 61f a25, the public key of the
vehicle which is concatenated with its pseudonyms. The root node’s ”next node”
field points to the node right after it, which in our case is a branch node (Branch
Node 0). If we look at the second pseudonym in Table 4.2 after concatenation, we
can find f after bf 61f a25. With this f , we can proceed into the next level, the leaf
node (Leaf Node 1 in Fig. 4.2), which stores both the remaining value of the key and
its current status. Therefore, we must start the search at the root node to lookup a
key in MMPT and then proceed to the subsequent nodes based on the shared nibbles
and remaining nibbles in the key. Finally, we can find the pseudonym and its status
at a leaf node.
The insertion operation creates an entry for a pseudonym of a vehicle and the
current status of the pseudonym in MMPT. We should first start from the root node
to insert a key-value pair. Next, determine the current node’s prefix value and its
Table 4.2: Pseudonyms and Current Status
Pseudonym
19a3fb45
f9365f57
7d339651
7d3978f9

Status
0
0
0
1
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Figure 4.3: MMPT combined with MHT for storing pseudonyms of vehicles

nibbles. If the current node has a prefix of 1, then check whether the slot following
the next nibble points to NULL. If this is the case, generate a new leaf node or a new
extension node based on the residual nibbles left in the key to be inserted. Otherwise,
navigate to the next node. If the current node’s prefix is 0, find the shared nibbles
and remaining nibbles left in the key. Next, a new leaf node, or a new branch node,
or a new extension node is generated based on the remaining nibbles left in the key
after sharing. For example, in Fig. 4.2, we first start from the root node to insert
key ”7d3978f 9” after concatenating it with the public key bf 61f a25 of the vehicle.
Next, we check the prefix of the current node. In our case, the root node’s prefix is
0, and it is Extension Node 0. After that, we traverse to the Branch Node 0, pointed
by the root node’s next node field. Since the slot corresponding to the next nibble
in the Branch Node 0 is not NULL and the remaining nibbles left in the key are
greater than 1. Therefore, we travel down to Extension Node 1, where the partial
path has diverged at Branch Node 1. We find that the slot corresponding to the
Branch Node 1 is NULL. Next, we generate a new leaf node (Leaf Node 3) into this
branch and set the status to 1 to indicate that this is the current pseudonym used
by the vehicle with public key bf 61f a25. The branch nodes, extension nodes, and
leaf nodes used in MMPT shortens the length of the unique path to leaf nodes and
makes it more efficient for inserting, retrieving, and removing pseudonyms. MMPT
has worst case complexity of O(n) for lookup, insert, and delete, where n is the length
of the pseudonym ( in hexadecimal representation).
MMPT is combined with the conventional blockchain to store the certificates
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Algorithm 6: Distribution of Pseudonyms by RT A
1 When a vehicle V registers with its home RT A
2 V ’s OBU is loaded with its (P UV , P RV ), a set of pseudonyms
{P ID1 , ..., P IDn }, and a P IDVinitial signed by the RT A
(E(H(P IDVinitial )||texp ), P RRT A ), where P IDVinitial ∈ {P ID1 , ..., P IDn }
and texp is the expiration time of P IDVinitial ;
3 RT A sends {P ID1 , ..., P IDn }, P IDinitial , and P UV to all RSU s in its region
using a secure protocol such as TLS;

of vehicles for authentication in BPPA [69]. In CREASE, each RSU maintains an
MHT combined with MMPT as shown in Fig. 4.3 to store and manage vehicles’
pseudonyms for efficient privacy-preserving authentication. Each RSU also maintains a database containing the public key of vehicle P UV , set of pseudonyms of
the vehicle {P ID1 , ..., P IDn } associated with the P UV , and corresponding MHVs.
RSUs use the MHVs of MHT to verify the presence/absence of the pseudonym in
the MMPT. Each MMPT stores the pseudonyms of a vehicle along with their latest
status (active/inactive). The lookup operation in MMPT makes it efficient for an
RSU to check and update the status of a specific pseudonym of a vehicle.
4.3

Detailed Description of CREASE

Distribution of Pseudonyms to Vehicles by their home RTA
In CREASE, RTAs generate pseudonyms to be used by all vehicles registered with it.
Initially, each vehicle V registers with its real ID with its home RTA. Each vehicle’s
OBU is loaded with its public-private key pair (P UV , P RV ), a set of pseudonyms
{P ID1 , ..., P IDn }, and one of the pseudonym is designated as an initial pseudonym
P IDVinitial after registration. P IDVinitial along with its expiration time texp is signed by
its home RTA (E(H(P IDinitial )||texp ), P RRT A ), where P IDinitial ∈ {P ID1 , ..., P IDn }
and texp is the expiration time of P IDVinitial . V uses this P IDVinitial to communicate
with an RSU that it encounters for the first time after the registration. RTA also
sends {P ID1 , ..., P IDn }, P IDVinitial , and P UV of V to all RSUs within its region using
a secure protocol such as TLS. Upon receiving this, RSUs concatenate the P UV with
the pseudonyms and inserts them along with their status into their MMPT. Initially,
the status of all pseudonyms is set to 0 (inactive) except for P IDVinitial . Thereby,
all the RSUs under an RTA get the pseudonyms of all vehicles registered under
the RTA. Detailed description of the pseudonym distribution process is presented in
Algorithm 6.
When a vehicle V enters an area covered by an RSU after registration
V listens to the beacon message of the RSU which includes its ID IDRSU , public
key P URSU , P URT A signed by TA (P URT A(signbyT A) ), root value of the MHT signed
by RTA (rootsignbyRT A ) (where rootsignbyRT A contains (root of MHT || RSA signa-
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Algorithm 7: When a Vehicle V enters an area covered by an RSU
1 Upon receiving the beacon message (IDRSU , P URT AsignbyT A , M HV s,
rootsignbyRT A , ts ) from the RSU , V authenticates the RSU in the
following way
2 if ts is valid then
3
Verifies the signatures of T A and RT A;
4
Retrieves root value and root generation timestamp of MHT from
rootsignbyRT A ;
5
if root generation timestamp is valid then
6
Calculates root value using M HV s and P URSU ;
7
if ( calculated root value == received root value ) then
8
RSU’s public key is authenticated;
9
else
10
RSU’s public key is not valid;
11
end if
12
end if
13 end if
14 After authenticating the RSU , V sends (E(P IDinitial ,
(E(H(P IDVinitial )||texp ),P RRT A ), P UV , ts ), P URSU ) to the RSU ;
15 When the RSU receives the above message from V
16 Decrypts the message using its private key P RRSU ;
17 if ts is valid then
18
Verifies the signature of RTA;
19
Retrieves texp ;
20
if texp is valid then
21
Retrieves H(P IDVinitial ) and checks it against the calculated hash of
P IDVinitial ;
22
if the hash values match then
23
if P IDVinitial ∈ MMPT then
24
Sets the status of the P IDVinitial to 1;
25
Sets new expiration time tnew for P IDVinitial ;
26
Sends (E(IDRSU , (E(H(P IDVinitial )|| tnew ), P RRSU ), Sk , Gk ,
ts ), P UV ) to V , where Gk is the group key and Sk is the
symmetric key between V and RSU ;
27
else
28
P IDVinitial is not valid;
29
end if
30
else
31
Authentication fails;
32
end if
33
end if
34 end if
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ture || TmhtRoot )), MHVs corresponding to the public key (P URSU ) of the RSU, and
timestamp ts . V first checks the freshness of the beacon message from RSU using ts .
Next, V verifies the signature of the TA and RTA. A vehicle can move across different
regions covered by several RTAs. We do not require vehicles to store all of the public
keys for all the RTAs. CREASE requires V only to store the P UT A to get the P URT A ,
which then can be used to verify the public key of the RSU. After verifying P UT A and
P URT A , V compares TmhtRoot in beacon message with the stored value of TmhtRoot . If
the received value of TmhtRoot is greater than or equal to the stored value of TmhtRoot ,
then the vehicle recalculates the root of MHT using the MHVs and hash value of
the public key P URSU of the sender RSU received in the beacon message. Next, V
compares the received MHT root value with the calculated root value of MHT. If the
two values are equal, P URSU is considered authentic. The detailed description of the
authentication of RSU using MHT is presented in first part of Algorithm 2. After
authenticating the RSU, V sends the following message to the RSU:
V → RSU : (E(P IDinitial ,(E(H(P IDVinitial )||texp ),P RRT A ), P UV , ts ), P URSU )
RSU, upon receiving the above message, uses received ts to verify the freshness of
the above message. After that, RSU verifies the signature of the RTA. Next, it retrieves the pseudonym expiration time texp . If texp is valid, then it calculates the
hash of the received initial pseudonym P IDVinitial and compares this calculated hash
value with received hash value H(P IDVinitial ). If these two hash values are equal,
then RSU concatenates public key of the vehicle P UV with the P IDVinitial and sets
the status of the P IDVinitial to 1 in the MMPT. RSU also sets new expiration time
tnew for P IDVinitial and signs it. RSU generates a symmetric key Sk for encrypting
and exchanging messages between the V and RSU. After that, it sends the following
message to the V :
RSU → V :(E(IDRSU , (E(H(P IDVinitial )|| tnew ), P RRSU ), Sk , Gk , ts ), P UV )
where, Gk is the group key to be used by all vehicles authenticated by the same RSU.
A detailed description of the above discussion is presented in the second part of the
Algorithm 7. After obtaining the group key Gk , vehicles under an RSU use Gk
to securely communicate with each other. A vehicle includes its current pseudonym
P IDVcurr signed by the RSU (E(H(P IDVcurr )|| texp ), P RRSU ) to its transmitted message m for vehicle to vehicle (V2V) authentication. It also appends message generation timestamp ts to prevent a replay attack. Whenever a vehicle needs to transmit
a message m to another vehicle, it encrypts m as follows:
V (Sender)→V (Receiver):(E(P IDVcurr ,(E(H(P IDVcurr ) || tnew ), P RRSU ), m, ts ), Gk )
The receiver vehicle can verify the authenticity of the received message by checking
the current pseudonym expiration time tnew and checking the received H(P IDVcurr )
against its calculated hash of received P IDVcurr in the above message. If both verifications are successful, the received message is considered authentic and valid. Otherwise, the receiver vehicle ignores the message.
4.3.1

Updating the Status of Pseudonym of a vehicle by RSU

Each Vehicle is supposed to change its pseudonym frequently to ensure privacy. The
US-based SAE J2735 standard [95] recommends changing pseudonym every 120 sec76

Algorithm 8: Updating the Status of Pseudonyms by RSU
1 When the validity time of V ’s current pseudonym P IDVcurr expires
2 V selects a new pseudonym P IDVnew from the set of pseudonyms allocated to
it;
3 Marks P IDVcurr as inactive;
4 Sends (E(P IDVcurr , P IDVnew , P UV , ts ), Sk ) to the RSU ;
5 When the RSU receives the above update message
6 Decrypts the message using secret key Sk ;
7 Checks the freshness of the received message using ts ;
8 if ts is valid then
9
Looksup into MMPT for P IDVcurr and P IDVnew ;
10
if P IDVcurr ∈ MMPT and P IDVnew ∈ MMPT then
11
Sets the status of these pseudonyms to 0 and 1 respectively;
′
12
Sets expiration time tnew for P IDVnew ;
′
13
Sends(E(E(H(P IDVnew )||tnew ), P URSU ), ts ), Sk ) to V ;
14
else
15
Does not update the pseudonyms and ignores the message;
16
end if
17 else
18
Drops the received message;
19 end if

onds or after 1 km distance traveled (whichever comes last), while the European
standard ETSI TS 102 867 [36] recommends changing pseudonym every five minutes.
While a vehicle is parked, it is probably not necessary to change pseudonym that
frequently. So, a vehicle needs 720 pseudonyms in 24 hours and 262,800 pseudonyms
in 1 year according to the US-based SAE J2735 standard. In CREASE, we assume
the vehicle’s OBU is loaded with sufficient number of pseudonyms so that it will
not need to reuse a pseudonym within a year. The size of each pseudonym is 16
bytes. Therefore, a vehicle requires approximately 4 MB of storage for storing its
pseudonyms. We assume that the vehicles have enough storage capability to store
its pseudonyms considering the current hardware capabilities. RSUs in our scheme
assist the vehicles in its region to change pseudonyms by attaching an expiration time
for each pseudonym. The expiration time indicates when a vehicle needs to change
its current pseudonym. Once this expiration time elapses, the vehicle will again communicate with its RSU to activate a new pseudonym from the pool of pseudonyms
received from its home RTA during initial registration. RSU determines the time
when all the vehicles in its region need to perform the pseudonym change. Thus,
vehicles within the same RSU’s region change their pseudonym simultaneously, resulting in reducing the chance of linkability between the new
pseudonym and the old pseudonym. We assume that the clocks of TA, RTAs,
RSUs and Vehicles(OBUs) are loosely synchronized. When the validity time of a
vehicle’s current pseudonym P IDVcurr is about to expire, it selects a new pseudonym
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P IDVnew from its stored set of pseudonyms and informs the RSU securely about its
new pseudonym. After receiving this pseudonym update message, the RSU concatenates the public key P UV of the vehicle with P IDVcurr and P IDVnew and looks up into
its MMPT. RSU sets the status of the pseudonyms P IDVcurr and P IDVnew to 0 and 1
in the MMPT respectively after successful verification. The RSU also sets expiration
′
time tnew for P IDVnew and sends it to V . The detailed description of updating the
status of a vehicle’s pseudonym is presented in Algorithm 9.
When a vehicle V moves from one RSU’s region to another RSU’s region
When a vehicle V moves from the region covered by one RSU RSUi to the region
covered by another RSU RSUj , V first verifies the authenticity of the RSUj as described in Algorithm 7. Next, V sends following message to RSUj to authenticate
itself for communication:
V →RSUj :(E(P IDVcurr ,(E(H(P IDVcurr )||tnew ), P RRSUi ), P UV , ts ), P URSUj )
The following two cases arise.
Case 1: RSUj is registered with the V ’s home RTA: RSUj , upon receiving the
above message, uses received ts to check the freshness of the message and verifies the
signature of the RSUi . If the verification is successful, then the RSUj verifies the authenticity of the current pseudonym P IDVcurr of the V as described in Algorithm 7.
Case 2: RSUj is not in the region covered by V ’s home RTA: The RSUj
first checks the freshness of the received message using ts and forwards the received
message to its home RTA. Next, the RSUj ’s home RTA communicates with the V ’s
home RTA and gets the set of pseudonyms allocated to the V , public key of the
vehicle P UV , and public key of RSUi P URSUi . RSUj ’s home RTA sends the required
credentials to the all RSUs in its region using a secure protocol such as TLS.
After obtaining the public key of RSUi , RSUj verifies the received hash value
from V as described in Algorithm 7. Next, RSUj inserts the set of pseudonyms of
V concatenating with its P UV along with their status in its MMPT.
′
After authenticating V , RSUj sets the new expiration time tnew for P IDVcurr and
sends the following message to the V :
′
′
′
RSUj →V :(E(IDRSUj ,(E(H(P IDVcurr )||tnew ), P RRSUj ), Sk , Gk , ts ), P UV )
′
where, Gk is the group key shared by all authenticated vehicles in the region of the
′
RSUj and Sk is the shared symmetric key between the V and RSUj . The detailed
description of the above discussion is presented in Algorithm 9.
4.4

Performance Evaluation

In this section, we first analyze the security of CREASE. Then, we present a formal
proof of correctness of CREASE using BAN logic [19]. Next, a verification of the
security of our scheme is presented using SPAN [50] and AVISPA [7] tools. Finally,
we compare our protocol with LIAP [111] and ASPA [4] protocols with respect to
security features and protocol overhead.
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Algorithm 9: When a Vehicle V moves from RSUi to RSUj
1

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

24
25
26
27
28
29

30
31
32
33
34
35

After verifying the authenticity of the RSUj as described in
Algorithm 2, V sends (E(P IDVcurr , (E(H(P IDVcurr ) ||tnew ), P RRSUi ),
P UV , ts ), P URSUj ) to RSUj
When the RSUj receives the above message from V
Decrypts the message using its private key P RRSUj ;
Case 1: RSUj is registered with V ’s home RT A
if ts is valid then
Verifies the signature of RSUi and retrieves tnew ;
if tnew is valid then
Retrieves H(P IDVcurr ) and checks against received P IDVcurr ;
if the hash values match then
if P IDVcurr ∈ MMPT then
Sets the status of the P IDVcurr to 1;
′
Sets new expiration time tnew for P IDVcurr ;
else
Ignores the update message;
end if
else
P IDVcurr is not valid;
end if
end if
end if
Case 2: RSUj is not registered with V ’s home RT A
if ts is valid then
Gets the set of pseudonyms allocated to the V , P UV , and P URSUi from
its home RT A through a secure protocol such as TLS;
RSUj verifies the signature of RSUi and retrieves tnew ;
if tnew is valid then
Retrieves H(P IDVcurr ) and checks against received P IDVcurr ;
if the hash values match then
Inserts the pseudonyms of the V into its MMPT;
Sets the status of all pseudonyms to 0 except P IDVcurr which is
set to 1;
′
Sets expiration time tnew for P IDVcurr ;
else
P IDVcurr is not valid;
end if
end if
end if
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4.4.1

Security Analysis

In this subsection, we discuss the security features of CREASE.
Mutual Authentication
Under CREASE, a vehicle V and RSU authenticate each other before communicating
with each other as follows. After obtaining the Missing Hash Values (MHVs), MHT
root signed by RTA rootsignbyRT A , public key of RTA signed by TA P URT AsignbyT A ,
and public key of the RSU P URSU , the vehicle recalculates the root value of the
MHT and compares it with the received rootsignbyRT A . If the two values are equal
P URSU is considered authentic. Next, the vehicle sends a message containing its
initial pseudonym P IDVinitial and initial pseudonym signed by the RTA along with
pseudonym expiration time E((H(P IDVinitial )||texp ), P RRT A ). Upon receiving the
message, RSU calculates the hash of received P IDVinitial and compares this calculated
hash value with received hash value H(P IDVinitial ). If these two hash values are equal,
then RSU looksup into the MMPT and set the status of the P IDVinitial to 1. After
mutual authentication, RSU sends a symmetric key Sk and a group key Gk to the
vehicle. The group key Gk is used by all vehicles authenticated by the same RSU for
secure communication.
Vehicle Anonymity
A sender uses only its pseudonym in all communication, which ensures that the receivers cannot obtain the sender’s real identity. Receivers authenticate the sender
based on temporary credentials. Only trusted authority should know the real identities and ensure conditional anonymity to achieve accountability. In CREASE, vehicles
use a pseudonym and pseudonym expiration time to send messages. Receivers authenticate the sender vehicle based on the pseudonym and its expiration time. The
real identity of a vehicle is never used in communication. The RTA only know the real
identity of the vehicle. The pseudonym of a vehicle is resolvable to its real identity
only by its RTA.
Unlinkability
Unlinkability requires that an adversary cannot link messages sent with two different
pseudonyms by the same vehicle. In CREASE, a vehicle uses its initial pseudonym
P IDVinitial for mutual authentication with an RSU after registration. Next, the RSU
sets a new expiration time tnew for P IDVinitial . Once this expiration time is about
to expire, the vehicle communicates with the RSU using the symmetric key Sk established between the vehicle and RSU during the mutual authentication process to
activate a new pseudonym from the pool of pseudonyms allocated to it. RSU assists vehicles in its region to change their pseudonym simultaneously and
frequently by associating an expiration time for a registered pseudonym.
Therefore, our scheme reduces the chance of linkability between the same
vehicle’s two pseudonyms.
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Non-repudiation
All messages sent by a vehicle contain its current pseudonym and the hash of its
current pseudonym P IDVcurr along with the pseudonym expiration time signed by
its RSU E((H(P IDVcurr )||tnew ), P RRSU ) in CREASE. The receiver firstly verifies the
signature of the RSU. Next, it checks the pseudonym expiration time. If it is valid
then it computes the hash of the received pseudonym and check it against the received
H(P IDVcurr ). If two hash values are same, then the sender is considered authentic.
Since the vehicle uses pseudonym from its stored set of pseudonym and registers it
with an RSU for communication. Therefore, the vehicle cannot deny the messages
sent by it. Besides, it is not possible for an attacker to forge the signature of the
RSU.
Resistance to Replay Attack
The message generation timestamp ts is encrypted along with all messages in CREASE
to resist the replay attack. The TA, RTAs, RSUs, and Vehicles’ clocks are assumed
to be loosely synchronized (this can be achieved using GPS) in our scheme. Due to
this addition of ts , each entity can detect whether the message is fresh enough to
prevent a replay attack.
Resistance to Sybil Attack
A Sybil attack occurs when a malicious vehicle uses multiple pseudonyms in parallel to impersonate a number of vehicles. Therefore, the number of pseudonyms
and their validity period that a vehicle can use should be limited. In CREASE,
each vehicle’s OBU is loaded with a set of pseudonyms, and the RTA signs one initial pseudonym along with the pseudonym expiration time E((H(P IDVinitial )||texp ),
P RRT A ). When a vehicle enters an RSU’s region after registration with an RTA, it
uses this initial pseudonym for authentication. The RSU sets a new expiration time
tnew for P IDVinitial and sends it to the vehicle. When the tnew is about to expire,
the vehicle communicates with the RSU to activate a new pseudonym from its pool
of pseudonyms. Then the RSU activates and signs a new pseudonym for the vehicle
′
along with the expiration time for that pseudonym E((H(P IDVnew )||tnew ), P RRSU ).
Therefore, only one pseudonym of a vehicle is valid at a time in CREASE and hence
it resists the Sybil attack.
Resistance to message injection Attack
Under CREASE, when a vehicle enters an RSU’s region after registration with an
RTA, it first verifies the signatures of TA P URT AsignbyT A and RTA rootsignbyRT A .
Then, it computes the MHT root value using MHVs and compares it with received
root value of MHT signed by the RTA. RSU is considered as legitimate if the two
values are equal, otherwise a message injection attack is detected. After authenticating the RSU, the vehicle sends its initial pseudonym P IDVinitial and the P IDVinitial
signed by the RTA along with the expiration time texp . The receiver RSU verifies the
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Table 4.3: BAN logic notation
Notation
P |≡ X
P ◁X
P| ∼ X
P ⇒X
S

P ←−
−k→ Q
#( X)
{X}k
℘κ( P, KP )
Π( KP−1 )
σ( X, KP−1 )

Description
P believes X
P sees X
P once said X
P controls X
Only P and Q know the shared secret key Sk
X is fresh
X is encrypted with the key k
P has public key KP
P has private key KP−1
X signed with private key KP−1

signature of the RTA and then it checks the texp . If texp is valid then it computes the
hash of the received pseudonym and checks it against the received H(P IDVinitial ). If
the two values are not equal, then a message injection attack is detected. It is not
possible for an attacker to forge the signature of TA or RTA.
4.4.2

Formal proof of correctness of CREASE based on BAN logic

Borrows, Abadi, and Needham (BAN) logic [19] is a popular authentication protocols
analysis model to formally verify the correctness of authentication protocols [67, 24,
33, 62, 61, 75]. In this subsection, we analyze CREASE using BAN logic and the PKIbased extended BAN logic [96] and demonstrate its correctness. First, we present
a brief overview of the BAN logic and the inference rules for BAN logic in this
subsection. Next, we discuss a formal idealization of the proposed CREASE scheme’s
messages, the list of initial assumptions, goals of our protocol, and logical derivation
to achieve the goals.
BAN Logic Notation
The list of BAN logic notations used in this section are presented in Table 4.3.
Protocol Idealization
For the formal analysis, the messages exchanged between RSU and Vehicle to achieve
mutual authentication is simplified and formally idealized as follows:
When a vehicle V enters an area covered by RSUi after registration following messages are exchanged for mutual authentication:
• M1: RSUi broadcasts the message: ⟨IDRSUi , σ(KRT A , KT−1A ), M HV s, σ(M HT root,
−1
KRT
A ), KRSUi , ts ⟩
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• M2: V →RSUi : ⟨{P IDVinitial , {H(P IDVinitial ) || texp }K −1 , KV , ts }KRSUi ⟩
RT A

S

−k→ V , Gk ,
• M3: RSUi →V : ⟨{IDRSUi , {H(P IDVinitial ) || tnew }K −1 , RSUi ←−
RSUi

ts }Kv ⟩

When a vehicle moves from RSUi to RSUj following messages are exchanged for mutual authentication:
• M4: RSUj broadcasts the message: ⟨IDRSUj , σ(KRT A , KT−1A ), M HV s, σ(M HT root,
−1
KRT
A ), KRSUj tsRSUj ⟩
• M5: V →RSUj : ⟨{P IDVcurr , {H(P IDVcurr ) || tnew }K −1 , KV , ts }KRSUj ⟩
RSUi

S

′

′
′

• M6: RSUj → V : ⟨{IDRSUj , {H(P IDVcurr ) || tnew }K −1 , RSUj ←−
−k→ V , Gk ,
RSUj

ts }Kv ⟩
Initial Assumptions
In CREASE, the TA and RTA are trusted by both RSUs and vehicles. RTAs, RSUs,
and vehicles know the public key of TA (KT A ). RTA is registered with the TA
−1
and gets its public and private key pairs (KRT A , KRT
A ). Every RTA generates the
−1
public and private key pairs for each RSU (KRSU , KRSU
) and vehicle (KV , KV−1 )
registered under it. Each vehicle’s OBU is loaded with a set of pseudonyms and an
initial pseudonym (P IDVinitial ) signed by its home RTA. The initial assumptions of
the protocol is summarized as follows:
• A1: V | ≡ ℘κ( T A, KT A )
• A2: V | ≡ Π( KT−1A )
• A3: RSUi | ≡ ℘κ( RT A, KRT A )
−1
• A4: RSUi | ≡ Π( KRT
A)

• A5: RSUj | ≡ ℘κ( RT A, KRT A )
−1
• A6: RSUj | ≡ Π( KRT
A)

• A7: V | ≡ ℘κ( RT A, KRT A )
−1
• A8: V | ≡ Π( KRT
A)

• A9: RSUj | ≡ ℘κ( RSUi , KRSUi )
−1
• A10: RSUj | ≡ Π( KRSU
)
i
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• A11: V | ≡ ℘κ( V, KV )
• A12: V | ≡ Π( KV−1 )
• A13: RSUi | ≡ RT A ⇒ M HT root
• A14: RSUj | ≡ RT A ⇒ M HT root
• A15: V | ≡ RT A ⇒ M HT root
S

• A16: RSUi | ≡ RSUi ⇒ (RSUi ←−
−k→ V , Gk )
S

• A17: V | ≡ RSUi ⇒ (RSUi ←−
−k→ V , Gk )
S

′
′

• A18: RSUj | ≡ RSUj ⇒ (RSUj ←−
−k→ V , Gk )
′

Sk

′

• A19: V | ≡ RSUj ⇒ (RSUj ←−
−→ V , Gk )
• A20: RSUi | ≡ RT A ⇒ (H(P IDVinitial )||texp )
• A21: RSUj | ≡ RT A ⇒ (H(P IDVinitial )||texp )
• A22: RSUj | ≡ RSUi ⇒ (H(P IDVcurr )||tnew )
• A23: RSUi | ≡ #( ts )
• A24: RSUj | ≡ #( ts )
• A25: V | ≡ #( ts )
Goal of CREASE
The goals of CREASE are:
• G1: V | ≡ RT A| ≡ M HT root
• G2: V | ≡ M HT root
• G3: RSUi | ≡ RT A| ≡ (H(P IDVinitial ) || texp )
• G4: RSUi | ≡ (H(P IDVinitial ) || texp )
S

• G5: V | ≡ RSUi | ≡ (RSUi ←−
−k→ V , Gk )
S

• G6: V | ≡ (RSUi ←−
−k→ V , Gk )
• G7: RSUj | ≡ RSUi | ≡ (H(P IDVcurr ) || tnew )
• G8: RSUj | ≡ (H(P IDVcurr ) || tnew )
′

Sk

′

• G9: V | ≡ RSUi | ≡ (RSUi ←−
−→ V , Gk )
S

′
′

• G10: V | ≡ (RSUi ←−
−k→ V , Gk )
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Derivation of the above goals
On the basis of logical postulates in Appendix A and initial assumptions, we derive
the above goals as follows.
From message M1, we deduce G1 and G2 as follows:
−1
• D1. V ◁ ⟨IDRSUi , σ(KRT A , KT−1A ), M HV s, σ(M HT root, KRT
A ), KRSUi , ts ⟩

• D2. V ◁ σ(KRT A , KT−1A ) ( From D1 and R5 (8) )
• D3. V | ≡ # (σ(KRT A , KT−1A )) ( From A25 and R4 )
• D4. V | ≡ T A| ∼ KRT A ( From A1, A2, and R1 (1) )
−1
• D5. V | ≡ # σ(M HT root, KRT
A ) ( From R4 and A21 )

• D6. V | ≡ RT A| ∼ M HT root ( From D11, A9, A10, and R1 (1) )
• D7. V | ≡ RT A | ≡ M HT root ( From D5, D6, and R2 ) ......................... (G1)
• D8.V | ≡ M HT root ( From A15, D7, and R3 ) ....................................... (G2)
From message M2, we deduce G3 and G4 as follows:
• D9. RSUi ◁ ⟨{P IDVinitial , {H(P IDVinitial ) || texp }K −1 , KV , ts }KRSU ⟩
RT A

• D10. RSUi ◁⟨{H(P IDVinitial ) || texp }K −1 ⟩ ( From D9 and R5 (8))
RT A

• D11. RSUi | ≡ # (H(P IDVinitial ) || texp ) ( From A23 and R4 )
• D12. RSUi | ≡ RT A| ∼ (H(P IDVinitial ) || texp ) ( From A3, A4, and R1 (1) )
• D13. RSUi | ≡ RT A | ≡ (H(P IDVinitial ) || texp ) ( From D11, D12, and R2 )
.................................................................................................................. (G3)
• D14. RSUi | ≡ (H(P IDVinitial ) || texp ) ( From A18, D13, and R3 ) ........... (G4)
From message M3, we deduce G5 and G6 as follows:
S

• D15. V ◁⟨{IDRSUi , {H(P IDVinitial ) || tnew }K −1 , RSUi ←−
−k→ V , Gk , ts }Kv ⟩
RSUi

S

• D16. V | ≡ # (RSUi ←−
−k→ V, Gk ) ( From A25 and R4 )
S

• D17. V | ≡RSUi | ∼ (RSUi ←−
−k→ V, Gk ) ( From A11, A12, D15, and R1 (3))
S

• D18. V | ≡RSUi | ≡ (RSUi ←−
−k→ V, Gk ) ( From D16, D17, and R2 ....... (G5)
S

• D19.V | ≡(RSUi ←−
−k→ V, Gk ) ( From A17, D18, and R3 ) ....................... (G6)
From message M4, we deduce G1 and G2 as follows:
−1
• D20. V ◁ ⟨IDRSUj , σ(KRT A , KT−1A ), M HV s, σ(M HT root, KRT
A ), KRSUj , ts ⟩

85

• D21. V ◁ σ(KRT A , KT−1A ) ( From D20 and R5 (8) )
• D22. V | ≡ # (σ(KRT A , KT−1A )) ( From A25 and R4 )
• D23. V | ≡ T A| ∼ KRT A (From A1, A2, and R1 (1) )
−1
• D24. V | ≡ # σ(M HT root, KRT
A ) ( From R4 and A25 )

• D25. V | ≡ RT A| ∼ M HT root ( From D20, A9, A10, and R1 (1) )
• D26. V | ≡ RT A | ≡ M HT root ( From D24, D25, and R2 ) .................... (G1)
• D27.V | ≡ M HT root ( From A15, D26, and R3) .................................. (G2)
From message M5, we deduce G7 and G8 as follows:
• D28. RSUj ◁ ⟨{P IDVcurr , {H(P IDVcurr ) || tnew }K −1 , KV , tV }K −1 ⟩
RSUj

RSUj

• D29. RSUj ◁⟨{H(P IDVcurr ) || tnew }K −1 ⟩ ( From D28 and R5 (8) )
RSUi

• D30. RSUi | ≡ # (H(P IDVcurr ) || tnew )( From A24 and R4 )
• D31. RSUj | ≡ RSUi | ∼ (H(P IDVcurr ) || tnew ) ( From A5, A6, and R1 (1) )
• D32. RSUj | ≡ RSUi | ≡ (H(P IDVcurr ) || tnew ) ( From D30, D31, and R2 )
.................................................................................................................. (G7)
• D33. RSUj | ≡ (H(P IDVcurr ) || tnew ) ( From A21, D32, and R3 ) ............ (G8)
From message M6, we deduce G9 and G10 as follows:
S

′

′
′

−k→ V , Gk , tRSUj }Kv ⟩
• D34. V ◁⟨{IDRSUj , {H(P IDVcurr ) || tnew }K −1 , RSUj ←−
RSUj

′

Sk

′

• D35. V | ≡ # (RSUj ←−
−→ V, Gk ) ( From A25 and R4 )
′

Sk

′

• D36. V | ≡RSUj | ∼ (RSUj ←−
−→ V, Gk ) ( From A11, A12, D34, and R1 (3) )
′

Sk

′

• D37. V | ≡RSUi | ≡ (RSUj ←−
−→ V, Gk ) ( From D35, D36, and R2 ) ..... (G9)
S

′
′

• D38.V | ≡(RSUj ←−
−k→ V, Gk ) ( From A19, D37, and R3 ) .................... (G10)
The above BAN logic analysis shows that our protocol achieves all the goals (G1G10) and vehicles can get the correct symmetric key and group key after a mutual
authentication process for secure communication.
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Figure 4.4: Message sequence chart of our scheme generated by SPAN and AVISPA
tool
4.4.3

Automated verification of CREASE based on SPAN ad AVISPA
tools

SPAN (Security Protocol ANimator)[50] and AVISPA (Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications)[7] tools are widely used in literature
[2, 6, 78, 10] for analysing the security of the protocols. In this research, we also
verify the security of our proposed CREASE scheme against replay attack, man-inthe-middle attack, and impersonation attack using SPAN and AVISPA tools.
In our model, we consider three basic roles which we call rsu, regionalT A, and
vehicle, and are denoted by a, b, and c respectively. Here, ka, kb, and kc represent
the public keys of the rsu, regionalT A, and vehicle respectively, and h represents
the cryptographic hash function. In the proposed protocol, regionalT A first activates
the start signal and sends a message to vehicle containing hash of initial pseudonym
nonce-1 and the expiration time nonce-2 of nonce-1 which are encrypted with its
private key inv(kb). The encrypted hash value and the initial pseudonym expiration
time are used by rsu to authenticate the initial pseudonym nonce-1 of the vehicle.

Figure 4.5: Message sequence chart of our scheme in the presence of intruder generated by SPAN and AVISPA tool
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Fig. 2.8 shows the message sequence chart of the proposed scheme using SPAN and
AVISPA tools.
The message sequence chart in the presence of an intruder is presented in Fig. 4.5.
This sequence chart demonstrates that the intruder is unable to read and/or modify
the messages. The intruder is only able to listen and forward the messages. We
describe the sequence of exchanged messages in presence of an intruder i as follows:
Step 1: The regionalT A initiates session and sends a message containing the vehicle’s
initial pseudonym nonce-1 and the expiration time nonce-2 of the nonce-1
(where, h(nonce-1) and nonce-1 is encrypted with its private key inv(kb)) to
the vehicle.
Step 2: Since the intruder does not know the private key of the vehicle, the intruder
only listens to the message.
Step 3: The vehicle sends the received message along with a nonce to the rsu.
Step 4: The intruder is unable to read and/or modify the message as it is encrypted
using public key ka of rsu. The intruder only views the message and passes it
to the rsu.
Step 5: Upon receiving the message, rsu retrieves the hash value and initial pseudonym
expiration time using public key kb of the regionalT A. Firstly, rsu verifies the
validity of initial pseudonym expiration time. Next, it recalculates the hash of
initial pseudonym received in the message to verify the initial pseudonym of
the vehicle. After that it sends back the received nonce along with another
generated nonce to the vehicle.
Step 6: The intruder only listens the message and passes it to the vehicle.
Step 7: The vehicle decrypts the message using its private key inv(ka) and retrieves
the nonces. Next, the vehicle sends back the received nonce to the rsu.
Step 8: The intruder is only able to view the message but unable to read or modify it.
He/she passes the message to the rsu.
4.4.4

Comparison with other related protocols

In this section, we compare the security features and the protocol overheads of
CREASE with those of the NERA [9], LIAP [111] and ASPA [4] schemes.
Security features comparison
In CREASE , RSUs provide pseudonym expiration time texp for each authentic vehicle within its transmission range. Each vehicle uses its current pseudonym P IDVcurr
signed by the RSU E((H(P IDVcurr )|| texp ), P RRSU ) for communication. It is not
posible for an attacker to forge the signature of the RSU. Besides, the message generation timestamp is encrypted along with the message in our scheme to resist the
88

replay attack. We assume that the clocks of the TA, RTAs, RSUs and vehicles are
loosely synchronized (this can be done using GPS). In LIAP [111], an RSU manages and assigns a local master key to every vehicle in its region after the mutual
authentication. A vehicle uses this master key to generate pseudonyms for VANET
communication. In ASPA [4], vehicles get multiple short-time pseudonym certificates
from the Pseudonym Provider (PP) and they are all valid at the same time interval. However, both LIAP and ASPA are not secure against Sybil attacks as multiple
pseudonyms of a vehicle are valid at the same interval. We present the comparison of
the security features of the CREASE with LIAP and ASPA in Table 4.4. The results
show that CREASE is more secure than the other two protocols.
Protocol Overhead Analysis
In CREASE, a vehicle first verifies the signature of the TA and RTA. Then, the
vehicle calculates the MHT root value using the Missing Hash Values (MHVs) received in the beacon message of the RSU for authentication. On an Intel Core 2
1.83GHz processor machine running Windows Vista in 32-bit mode, RSA 2048 signature verification takes 0.16 ms, and SHA-256 hash computation takes 111 MiB/s
using Crypto++ 5.6.0 [31]. With much lower computation costs for the hash function
calculation, the total cost of RSU authentication in CREASE depends mainly on RSA
signature verification. On the other hand, a vehicle uses a linear search to check the
RSU certificate revocation list (RCRL) for authentication in the LIAP scheme [111].
NERA scheme [9] uses the bilinear pairing and Map-To-Point operations, which cause
overhead in RSU authentication. Since the authentication of RSUs by vehicles is not
taken into consideration in ASPA protocol [4]. Therefore, Fig. 4.6 presents the comparison of RSU authentication overhead involved in CREASE with that of LIAP and
NERA. There is a significant increase in RSU authentication cost when the number of
revoked RSUs increases in LIAP. On the contrary, the RSU authentication cost is low
under NERA and very low under CREASE. Fig. 4.6 shows that the authentication
overhead under LIAP is almost three times as much as CREASE when the number
of revoked RSUs reaches 30.
In CREASE, RSU first decrypts the message from a vehicle using its private key
P RRSU . Then it verifies the signature of the RTA. Then, it concatenates the public
key of the vehicle with the vehicle’s initial pseudonym and looks up into the MMPT.
Table 4.4: Comparison of Security Features
Mutual Authentication
Vehicle Anonymity
Uninkability
Non-repudiation
Resistance to Replay Attack
Resistance to Sybil Attack
Resistance to Message Injection Attack

CREASE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

89

NERA
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes

ASPA
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

LIAP
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

Figure 4.6: RSU Authentication Overhead Comparison

In both LIAP [111] and NERA [9], RSU checks the Vehicle Certificate Revocation List
(VCRL) after decrypting the message from vehicle. Next, it verifies the signature of
the Certificate Authority (CA) to authenticate the vehicle. The signature verification
overhead in LIAP and NERA protocol using bilinear pairing is Tmul +Tmtp +3Tpar .
Here, Tmul denotes the time of performing one point multiplication (Tmul =0.39 ms),
Tmtp denotes the time for performing a MapToPoint hash operation(Tmtp =0.09 ms),
and Tpar denotes the time for performing a pairing operation(Tpar =3.21 ms)[111].
In ASPA protocol, a vehicle uses its initial pseudonym provided by the Vehicular
Manufacturing Company (VMC) to request a longterm certificate (LTC) from the
Certificate Authority (CA). CA checks the CRL to issue a LTC for the vehicle. Next,
the vehicle gets a Pseudonym Certificate (PC) from the LTC Authority using the LTC.
The vehicle sends a message to the Pseudonym Provider (PP) directly or through
RSU for pseudonyms using the PC. After verifying the PC of the vehicle, Pseudonym
Provider sends multiple pseudonyms to the vehicle. The signature verification cost in
this scheme using Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) is 0.37 ms [4]. A comparison
of the signature verification overhead of CREASE with LIAP [111], NERA [9], and
ASPA [4] is presented in Fig. 4.7. It is observed that CREASE has significantly lower
signature verification overhead compared to LIAP, NERA, and ASPA. For example,
when the number of vehicles reaches 30, the overall signature verification cost is
approximately 92 ms for both LIAP [111] and NERA [9] and 22 ms for ASPA [4],
whereas it is only 4.8 ms for CREASE.
In CREASE, vehicle and RSU authenticates each other without using certificate
and certificate revocation lists (CRLs). Vehicles use Missing Hash Values (MHVs)
and Public key of the RSU P URSU received in the RSU’s beacon message to recalculate the MHT root value. Next, the vehicle checks this hash value against the
received root value of MHT signed by the RTA rootsignbyRT A for authentication. After
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Figure 4.7: Signature Verification Overhead Comparison

authenticating the RSU, the vehicle sends its initial pseudonym signed by the RTA
along with the pseudonym expiration time E((H(P IDVinitial )||texp ), P RRT A ), initial
pseudonym P IDVinitial , and its public key P UV for authentication. RSU first checks
if texp is valid. After that, it computes the hash of the P IDVinitial in the received message and compares it with the received H(P IDVi nitial ). If the hash values matches
then P IDVinitial is considered as valid. On the contrary, vehicles use long-term certificates for authentication in both LIAP [111] and ASPA [4] schemes. Next, the RSUs
or Pseudonym Providers (PP) check the latest Certificate Revocation List (CRLs) of
vehicles to verify the vehicles’ authenticity. In NERA scheme [9] the TA revokes the
malicious vehicle and adds its real ID to the CRL. In these schemes, the CA (Certificate Authority) or TA maintains a certificate revocation list ( CRL) and distributes
the updated CRL of vehicles to all entities in VANET. A CRL typically consists of a
header, the current date, the last time it has been updated, the next time it will be updated, and a complete list of revoked certificates signed by the CA [73]. Moreover, the
size of CRL increases significantly as the number of entities grows. Therefore, the use
of CRLs for authentication incurs significant computation and communication overhead. Besides, the CA needs to send the CRLs very often to keep the communication
updated and secure. So, the LIAP, ASPA, and NERA schemes introduce significant
additional communication overhead on RSUs or Pseudonym Providers (PPs).
4.5

Summary

We presented a novel and efficient privacy-preserving authentication scheme that
leverages both Merkle Hash Tree and Modified Merkle Patricia Trie; our scheme allows vehicles to get a set of pseudonyms once and pick one random pseudonym from
this set at a time and use it to preserve privacy. MHT and MMPT data structures
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help in managing and storing these pseudonyms efficiently for verifying the authenticity of the vehicles while at the same time preserving their privacy. MHT of public
keys of RSUs also help in authenticating RSUs efficiently without certificates. Our
scheme does not require the RSUs and vehicles store the certificates and CRL for
authentication. Our scheme is robust against replay attacks, man-in-the-middle attacks, and impersonation attacks. We compared the security properties and protocol
overhead of our scheme with those of other related protocols and also presented a
formal proof of correctness.
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Chapter 5 Conclusion and Future Works

In the last decade, there has been growing interest in Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks
(VANETs). Today, car manufacturers have already started to equip vehicles with
sophisticated sensors that can provide many assistive features such as front collision avoidance, automatic lane tracking, partial autonomous driving, suggestive lane
changing, and so on. Such technological advancements are enabling the adoption of
VANETs not only to provide safer and more comfortable driving experience but also
to provide many other useful services to the driver as well as passengers of a vehicle. However, privacy, authentication, and secure message dissemination are some of
the main issues that need to be thoroughly addressed and solved for the widespread
adoption/deployment of VANETs. In this chapter, we summarize the results of our
dissertation and also discuss future works.
5.1

Summary of the Dissertation

First, we proposed a distributed and scalable privacy-preserving authentication scheme
based on two-layer architecture. The upper layer consists of Trusted authority (TA)
and Regional TAs (RTAs), while the lower layer consists of Road Side Units (RSUs)
and vehicles. TA is the root of our system model, while each RTA acts as a lowerlevel local TA. Our scheme uses Merkle Hash Tree (MHT) root value combined with
the latest MHT root generation timestamp (TmhtRoot) to reduce the storage and
computational overhead associated with the traditional Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) based authentication schemes for authenticating RSUs. In our scheme, a vehicle needs to store only the the public key of the Trusted Authority (TA) and the
latest Merkle Hash Tree (MHT) root generation timestamp to authenticate the public
key of RSUs, thereby authenticating the RSUs themselves. We use Modified Merkle
Patricia Trie (MMPT) to eliminate the space and computation- intensive CRL for
efficient authentication of vehicles by RSUs. In many of the existing schemes, when
a vehicle observes an event, this event is disseminated to every vehicle within its
transmission range, which in turn is forwarded to other vehicles using an underlying
routing protocol. It can cause message transmission overhead due to the dissemination of the same event by several vehicles. However, in our scheme, a vehicle sends
messages to authenticated RSUs for further dissemination. Only RSUs are responsible for disseminating messages to vehicles within their transmission range and other
relevant RSUs through their home RTAs. So, RSUs can aggregate messages and
prevent the propagation of redundant messages to vehicles.
Second, we present a low overhead and efficient privacy-preserving pseudonymbased authentication scheme by leveraging cuckoo filters (CF). Authentication schemes
based on pseudonyms that assign each vehicle multiple identities can improve privacy
significantly. However, the overhead of maintaining such a large volume of identities
is overwhelming for traditional Certificate Revocation List (CRL) based solutions.
In our scheme, the Local Trusted Authority (LTA) assigns a set of pseudonyms to
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all vehicles in its region. We use Merkle Hash Tree (MHT) to maintain the set of
pseudonyms allocated to a vehicle. LTA inserts the MHT root value associated with
the vehicle’s set of pseudonyms in its region in a positive cuckoo filter. If a vehicle is
found to be malicious, the LTA, instead of inserting all the unexpired pseudonyms,
only inserts the MHT root value associated with the vehicle’s set of pseudonyms in
a negative cuckoo filter. LTA also maintains positive and negative cuckoo filters to
manage legitimate RSUs and compromised RSUs. Both vehicles and RSUs only need
to store and check the cuckoo filters from the LTA for mutual authentication. The
use of cuckoo filters supports efficient insert, delete, and lookup operation, which
significantly improves the authentication efficiency.
Third, we proposed a distributed and decentralized certificateless authentication
scheme for efficient management of pseudonyms of vehicles. We combined MHT with
Modified Merkle Patricia Trie to store vehicles’ pseudonyms along with their corresponding ’current status’ values. In our scheme, RSUs use missing hash values of
MHT to verify the presence or absence of a specific pseudonym of a vehicle in the
MMPT. The use of branch nodes, extension nodes, and leaf nodes provides an efficient
way to insert, delete, and update a specific pseudonym and its corresponding status.
In our scheme, RSUs assist vehicles in their region to change their pseudonyms simultaneously. This is achieved by assigning the same expiration time to the pseudonyms
of all vehicles in an RSU’s region. Expiration time associated with a pseudonym helps
vehicles within the same RSU’s region to simultaneously and frequently change their
pseudonyms. Therefore, it reduces the chance of message linking attack as well as
vehicle’s traceability by an attacker.
5.2

Future Works

The following are some of the future works that we intend to do for moving this
research forward:
• Although our scheme provides an efficient way to authenticate and disseminate messages to relevant vehicles, it still depends on RSUs for communication.
However, with the increasing number of RSUs, the overhead will grow. Therefore, we need to improve our authentication and message dissemination scheme
for large-scale applications.
• Considering the potential benefit of cuckoo filter, we plan to use the cuckoo
filters for an efficient vehicle to vehicle (V2V) authentication to enhance the
security of V2V communication.
• We will also explore quantum-resistant cryptography for VANET system as
recent advancements in quantum computing have made most traditional cryptographic algorithms vulnerable.

Copyright© Shafika Showkat Moni, 2022.
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Appendix

Appendix A: Inference Rules for BAN Logic
BAN logic postulates are used to derive the goal from the protocol idealization and
the initial assumption. The inference rules are listed next:
• R1:Message meaning rule
P | ≡ ℘κ( Q, KQ ) , P | ≡ Π( KQ−1 ) , P ◁ σ( X, KQ−1 )
P | ≡ Q| ∼ X

(1)

Here P and Q are communication entities. If P believes that Q has public key
KQ and private key KQ−1 , and Q sees X encrypted with KQ−1 , then P believes
that Q generated X.
P | ≡ ℘κ( Q, KQ ) , P | ≡ Π( KQ−1 ) , P ◁ σ( ℜ( X, P ) , KQ−1 )
P | ≡ Q| ∼ X

(2)

Similarly, if P believes that Q has public key KQ and private key KQ−1 , and
Q sees X encrypted with KQ−1 for which P is the intended recipient, then P
believes that Q once said X.
P | ≡ Q| ∼ ( Cert( Texp , st) ) , P | ≡ Q| ≡ Texp
P | ≡ Q| ≡ st

(3)

In the above rule, Q acts as the issuer of a certificate. If P believes that Q once
said about a certificate statement st which is still valid for a duration of time
Texp , then P believes in the statement st for the duration Texp .
S

P | ≡ P ←−
−k→ Q, P ◁ {X}Sk
P | ≡ Q| ∼ X

(4)

If P believes that Q shared a key Sk with it and P sees X encrypted with Sk ,
then P believes Q once said X.
• R2:Nonce Verification rule
P | ≡ #( X) , P | ≡ Q| ∼ X
P | ≡ Q| ≡ X

(5)

The above rule concerns with the freshness of the message with respect to the
time. If P believes that X could have been uttered only recently and Q once
said X, then P believes Q believes in the freshness of X.
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• R3:Jurisdiction rule
P | ≡ Q ⇒ X, P | ≡ Q| ≡ X
P| ≡ X

(6)

If P believes that Q has jurisdiction over X and P believes Q believes X, then
P believes X.
• R4:Freshness rule
P | ≡ #( X)
P | ≡ #( X, Y )

(7)

This rule states that if one of the components of a message is fresh, then the
entire message is fresh.
• R5:Sees rule
P ◁ ( X, Y )
P ◁ ( X)

(8)

P ◁ σ( ℜ( X, all) , KQ−1 )

(9)

P ◁ σ( ℜ( X, P ) , KQ−1 )
P | ≡ ℘κ( Q, KQ ) , P | ≡ Π( KQ−1 ) , P ◁ {X}K −1
Q

P ◁X
P | ≡ ℘κ( Q, KQ ) , P | ≡ Π( KQ−1 ) , P ◁ σ( X, KQ−1 )
P ◁X
P | ≡ ℘κ( P, KP ) , P | ≡ Π( KP−1 ) , P ◁ {X}K −1
P

P ◁X
S

(10)

(11)

(12)

P | ≡ P ←−
−k→ Q, P ◁ {X}Sk
(13)
P ◁X
This rule states that if P sees a message, then it can see the components of the
message as P knows the necessary key.
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[12] S. Biswas and J. Mišić. Establishing trust on VANET safety messages. In
Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Ad Hoc Networks (ADHOCNETS 2010), Victoria, BC, Canada: Springer, 2010., 2010.
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